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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered in 1983 by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The purpose of the review is to indicate cases of first impression and
cases that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North
Dakota law.
The following topics are included in the review:
Adm inistrative Law ...................................
Business A ssociations ..................................
C ivil Procedure ......................................
C ontracts . .... .......... ... ... .. .. .. .... ............
Criminal Law and Procedure ............................
D am ages ...........................................
D om estic R elations ...................................
Election L aw ........................................
G overnm ent ........................................
Interpretation and Construction
of Statutes ................ ......................
Liability ...........................................
M ental H ealth .......................................
P roperty . .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .. .
Statutes of Lim itation ..................................
W orkmen's Compensation ..............................
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Garner Public School v. Golden Valley County Committee
In Garner Public School v. Golden Valley County Committee' Lone
Tree Public School District (Lone Tree) appealed the decision of
the district court for Golden Valley County, which reversed the
order of the State Board of Public School Education approving the
dissolution of Garner Public School. 2 On appeal Lone Tree claimed
that the Golden Valley County Committee for Reorganization of
School Districts' (County Committee) dissolution plan was not
subject to direct judicial review under the North Dakota
Administrative Agencies Practice Act. 3 Lone Tree further claimed
that the supreme court should defer to the decisions of an
administrative agency, in this case the State Committee for
Reorganization of School Districts (State Committee), when
reviewing school system dissolution plans.4
The supreme court agreed with Lone Tree and reversed the
rulings of the district court.5 The supreme court held that chapter
15-53.1 of the North Dakota Century Code6 did not create a right
to direct judicial review of the County Committee's decision when
the committee was considering the dissolution of a single school
district. 7 The supreme court stated that it exercises restraint when
reviewing administrative agency findings and does not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency." The court, therefore, accepted
the approved plan and remanded-the issue to the State Committee
for the purpose of holding a public hearing regarding the
adjustment of the property, liabilities, and debts of Garner Public
School. 9
Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board
In Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board0 Hammond
1. 334 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1983).
2. Garner Pub. School v. Golden Valley Country Comm., 334 N.W.2d 665, 666-67 (N.D.
1983).
3. Id. at 670. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (Administrative Agencies
Practice Act).
4. 334 N.W.2d at 671.
5. Id. at 667.
6. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-53.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983) (annexation reorganization and
involuntary dissolution of public school districts).
7. 334 N.W.2d at 671.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 674.
10. 332 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1983).
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lost his job as an employee of the State. The State Personnel Board
(Board) upheld his loss of employment, and Hammond appealed
the decision to the district court.1" Hammond then appealed from
the district court judgment, which dismissed Hammond's
administrative appeal, under chapter 28-32 of the North Dakota
Century Code, for lack of subject matter juridiction. 12 Hammond
raised two issues before the supreme court: whether the Board was
an agency whose decisions are appealable under chapter 28-3213
and whether the Board had authority to review dismissals of
classified state employees.14
The Board contended that it was a division of the Office of
Management and Budget, whose decisions cannot be appealed to
the district court. 15 The supreme court held that the Board was not
an office or division of the Office of Management and Budget and
its final decisions, therefore, were not exempt from appeal to the
district court under subsection 28-32-01 (1) (a) of the North Dakota
Century Code. 16 The court also held that the Board was an
administrative agency whose final orders and decisions were
appealable to the district court,' 7 and that the Board had authority
to review dismissals of classified state employees.' 8 The court,
therefore, reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
proceedings on the merits of Hammond's administrative appeal. 19
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Voltz v. Dudgeon
In Voltz v. Dudgeon20 Dudgeon appealed from a judgment for
Voltz based upon a finding that a joint venture relationship existed
between the parties. 21 Voltz employed Dudgeon to operate a
grain truck that Voltz owned. 22 When the trucking operation was
11. Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 332 N.W.2d 244, 245 (N.D. 1983).
12. Id. The trial court concluded that the State Personnel Board did not have authority to
confirm or deny terminations of employment from non-merit state agencies and that the Board's
order, having no legal significance, was not a proper subject matter for appeal to district court. Id. See
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (Administrative Agencies Practice Act) (1974 & Supp. 1983).
13. 332 N.W.2d at 245.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 246. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-32-01(1) (a) (Supp. 1983).
16. 332 N.W.2d at 246. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-32-01(1) (a) (Supp. 1983).
17. 332 N.W.2d at 246.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 245.
20. 334 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1983).
21. Voltz v. Dudgeon, 334 N.W.2d 204, 205 (N.D. 1983). The lower court initially held that a
partnership existed between the parties. Id. at n. 1. However, upon a rehearing, the court concluded
that no partnership existed, but ajoint venture did exist. Id.
22. Id. at 205.
19841 327
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
discontinued Voltz brought suit, alleging that a partnership
existed between the parties and that Dudgeon was responsible for
one-half of the expenses incurred during the course of the
business. 23
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
finding that the parties were engaged in a joint venture. 24 The court
stated that in addition to limitations on scope and duration, a joint
venture must include contribution, joint proprietorship and
control, sharing of profits but not necessarily of losses, and an
express or implied contract. 25 The court found facts, including joint
contributions to a common undertaking, 26 and conduct of the
parties showing an implied agreement to share profits and losses
associated with the operation of the truck, 27 which established a
joint venture relationship in the operation of the trucking
business. 28 In addition, the court held that Dudgeon was liable to
Voltz for a loan that Dudgeon advanced to a third party without the
prior approval of Voltz and that the loan was outside the scope of
the joint venture. 29
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Gauer v. Klemetson
In Gauer v. Klemetsen30 the defendants appealed from the order
of the district court dismissing their counterclaim for contribution
or indemnity in a personal injury suit. 31 The supreme court
considered whether the judgment or order for dismissal of the
counterclaim was appealable. 32
The supreme court stated that unless the district court order
23, Id.
24. Id. at 206.
25, Id. at 206-07. The Voltz court followed the analysis of elements of a joint venture set forth by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 236 Minn. 230, 52 N.W.2d 455
(1952). 334 N.W.2d at 206.
26. 334 N.W.2d at 206. Although Dudgeon did not contribute any funds to the business, he
contributed his time, skill, knowledge, and expertise in driving and repairing the truck. Id. Dudgeon
also maintained business records and oversaw the general operation of the venture. Id.
27. Id. at 206-07. Dudgeon testified that he expected to gain equity in the truck and
subsequently to share in the profits of the operation. Id. at 207. Dudgeon also cosigned a retail
installment contract with Voltz to purchase a truck in the name of the business. Id. Dudgeon's
implied agreement to share in the losses was also evidenced by his willingness to receive
compensation only when sufficient funds were present in the business checking account. Id.
28. Id. at 206-07,
29. Id. at 207.
30. 333 N.W.2d 436 (N.D. 1983).
31, Gauer v. Klemetson, 333 N.W.2d 436, 437 (N.D. 1983). The two defendants
counterclaimed in a personal injury action alleging that one of the plaintiffs negligently contributed
to the injury of the other plaintiffon the premises of the defendants' restaurant. Id.
32. Id.
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directs entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure the order of dismissal of a
counterclaim is interlocutory and ordinarily cannot be appealed
prior to entry of a final judgment in the main action. 33 The Gauer
court asserted that the substantive issues raised by the defendants
in their counterclaim had not been disposed by the dismissal order
and that these issues might be raised and proved in the main
action. 34 The defendants also retained their rights to appeal both
the determination of liability and the dismissal of the counterclaim
in an appeal from final judgment on the merits. 35 Therefore, the
supreme court held the order of dismissal was not appealable and
the appeal was dismissed. 36
CONTRACTS
Hastings Pork v. Johanneson
In Hastings Pork v. Johanneson37 the supreme court affirmed a
summary judgment enforcing the terms of a settlement
agreement. 38 The settlement agreement required that Johanneson
and Olson transfer to Hastings certain mineral interests having an
aggregate fair market value of $200,000 in return for dismissal of a
lawsuit commenced by Hastings. 39 The agreement provided that if
the appraised value of the minerals submitted was less than
$200,000, then, within fifteen days, Johanneson and Olson would
provide a listing of additional mineral interests that would bring the
value up to $200,000.40 The agreement further provided that if
Johanneson and Olson failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement, Hastings would be entitled to $157,812.50 plus
interest, the amount of damages claimed in the initial complaint. 41
The district court determined that Johanneson and Olson had
breached the agreement by failing to provide Hastings with a listing
of additional mineral interests of sufficient value within fifteen days
of notification that the appraised value of the interests initially sub-
mitted was less than $200,000.42 The district court concluded that
33. Id. at 437-38. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 54 (b) (final judgment when more than one claim is
presented).
34. 333 N.W.2d at 438-39.
35. Id. at 439.
36. Id.
37. 335 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1983).
38. Hastings Pork v. Johanneson, 335 N.W.2d 802, 803 (N.D. 1983).
39. Id. at 804.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 804 & n. 3.
42. Id. at 804. The first listing of mineral interests submitted by Johanneson and Olson was
19841
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no genuine issues of material fact existed and entered summary
judgment for Hastings.4 3
On appeal Johanneson and Olson argued that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the agreement was
ambiguous.4 4 Johanneson and Olson contended the agreement did
not specify what was to happen if the second listing did not bring
the market value of the mineral interests up to $200,000. 45 They
further contended that it is reasonable to infer that they would be
permitted to submit additional interests to Hastings if done in good
faith and within a reasonable time. 46
The supreme court agreed with the district court's
interpretation of the agreement. 47 The court, in essence, read the
settlement agreement to mean that Johanneson and Olson had only
two opportunities to submit mineral interests for evalution. 48 The
court noted that, according to section 9-07-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code, if a contract is reduced to writing the intention of
the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible. 49
The supreme court agreed with the district court's conclusion that
Johanneson and Olson were in breach when they failed to tender
mineral interests valued at $200,000 according to the terms of the
settlement agreement. 50
In his dissent Justice VandeWalle stated that, as applied in
Hastings, the settlement agreement was ambiguous. 1  The
ambiguity involved the nominal valuation that the appraiser gave
to the Canadian mineral interests because of potential problems
with Canadian acreage. 52 Justice VandeWalle recognized that the
agreement must be interpreted to mean the appraiser could attempt
to place a fair market value on the Canadian interests despite any
potential problems. 53 He said that the decision of the district court
should be reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the intent of the parties concerning the
appraised at $23,865. Id. The additional listing, submitted pursuant to the agreement, was appraised
at $20,000. Id. Hastings rejected further attempts by Johanneson and Olson to tender additional
interests. Id.
43. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (motion and proceedings for summary judgment).
44. 335 N.W.2d at 805.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 806.
48. Id.
49. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-07-04 (1975).
50. 335 N.W.2d at 806.
51. Id. (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
52. Id. The appraiser stated that the potential problems involved lack of control, taxes, trustee's
fees, and uncertain marketability. Id.
53. Id. at 806-07.
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valuation of the Canadian mineral interests at the time they entered
into the agreement.54
Ned Nastrom Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co.
In Ned Nastrom Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co. 55
the trial court ruled that Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co. (NPN)
was liable to Ned Nastrom Motors, Inc. (NNM) under the terms of
seven lease agreements and that Donald Peterson personally
guaranteed NPN's indebtedness under such agreements. 56 On
appeal Peterson raised two issues: whether NPN had an obligation
to pay NNM under the specific financial transactions in question
and whether Peterson personally guaranteed NPN's indebtedness
to NNM. 57
The facts showed that NNM and NPN entered into
approximately seventy lease agreements in which NNM was the
lessor and NPN the lessee. 58 Of particular importance were seven
lease agreements under which NPN purchased the items covered
by the leases but gave NNM invoices showing that Ned Nastrom
Motors was the lessor. 59 NNM assigned the leases to a bank and
paid NPN for the items with the proceeds. 60 The end result of this
financial arrangement was that NNM was under an obligation to
pay the bank and NPN was to pay NNM the same amount.
61
Peterson contended that the monies advanced to NPN
constituted capital contributions and that NNM was not a secured
creditor. 62  Peterson also contended that the trial court's
determination of the amount of damages therefore was in error. 6
3
The court held that the monies advanced were not capital
contributions because NPN submitted payments to NNM on the
seven leases, that the transactions were reflected in NPN's books as
liabilities, and that four of the seven leases were executed as written
54. Id. at 807.
55. 338 N.W.2d 64 (N.D. 1983).
56. Ned Nastrom Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co., 338 N.W.2d 64, 65 (N.D.
1983). Donald Peterson, the controlling shareholder in Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer (NPN),
brought this appeal. Id. at 65.
57. Id. at 65. The court divided its opinion into two sections: NPN's obligation to Ned Nastrom
Motors (NNM) and Donald Peterson's personal guarantee of NPN's obligation to NNM. Id. at 65,
68.
58. Id. at 66. Peterson and Nastrom exchanged stock in the two companies resulting in Nastrom
being the sole owner of NNM and Peterson becoming the controlling shareholder in NPN. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 67.
63. Id.
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leases thereby implying that all seven were intended by the parties
to be leases. 64 The supreme court held that the trial court's damage
award was not clearly erroneous because the damages could be
mathematically calculated. 65
The supreme court then discussed Peterson's personal.
guarantee of NPN's obligation to NNM. 66 The facts showed that
when NPN bought equipment, the party financing the purchase
was usually entitled to receive all or a portion of the proceeds NPN
received from the sale of the equipment. 67 Peterson had personally
guaranteed a large number of NPN's debts. 68 After a manufacturer
attached NPN's assets pending foreclosure, Peterson negotiated to
sell NPN's assets so Peterson could be absolved of all personal
liability. 69 Subsequently, Peterson told Nastrom that Nastrom
would be "taken care of" personally by him or out of the
company's funds. 7 0
Peterson contended that his statements to Nastrom were not a
personal guarantee or, in the alternative, unenforceable because
the statements were not in writing. 71 The court held that the trier of
fact was to determine whether the statement was a personal
guarantee. 72 Since the facts showed that it was possible that
Peterson did personally guarantee the obligations, the court held
that Peterson personally guaranteed NPN's obligations. 73  The
court also held that when the leading objective of the promisor is to
subserve some interest or purpose of his own, his promise need not
be in writing to be enforceable. 74 The court found that Peterson's
64. Id. The court found that, because the transactions were entered on the books of NPN as
liabilities, the parties involved could not have intended that the monies were injections of capital. Id.
The court also found that even though the parties did not execute written leases on three of the
transactions, they were structured in the same way as the other four leases. Id.
65. Id. at 68. Peterson stated that unrebutted accounting testimony showed that the damages
due were $24,622.23. Id. The accountant did state that this figure merely represented four of the
seven leases and did not include the three leases to construction companies. Id. The court found that,
by including these three leases, the trial court could have found $163,793.21 was owed NNM. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 68, 69.
69. Id. at 69. Clark Equipment, a manufacturer, had a blanket security interest on virtually all
of NPN's machinery and other property. Id. at 68. Consequently, Peterson attempted to sell the
assets of NPN to generate enough capital to pay NPN's creditors. Id. at 69. Subsequent to the sale,
NPN did satisfy all creditors except NNM. Id.
70. Id. at 69.
71. Id. at 69-70.
72. Id. at 69 (citing Nelson v. TMH, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 580, 583 (N.D. 1980); State Bank v.
Rauh, 288 N.W.2d 299, 305 (N.D. 1980)).
73. Id. at 70. Nastrom and Peterson were involved in numerous business ventures in the past.
Id. Based on these prior dealings, Nastrom believed that Peterson's "word was better than most
men's checks." Id. The court found that, given the relationship between the two men, Peterson must
have known that Nastrom would interpret his statements as a personal guaranty. Id.
74. Id. at 71. The North Dakota Century Code provides, "Except when a guarantee is
deemed an original obligation as provided in section 22-01-05, a guaranty must be in writing and
signed by the guarantor, but the writing need not express consideration." N.D. CENT. CODE S 22-
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oral guarantee was to further the sale of the assets and that Nastrom
relied on Peterson's promise in refraining from bringing any legal
action. Peterson was, therefore, personally liable for any debt owed
to NNM from NPN. 75
Yon v. Great Western Development Corp.
In June of 1981 Great Western Development Corporation
entered into a contract for deed to purchase a parcel of real estate
from the Yons. 76 The contract contained a standard acceleration
clause allowing the Yons to cancel the contract upon default by
Great Western. 77 Great Western entered into a contract for deed,
with an essentially identical acceleration clause, to sell the property
to RF Investment.7 8 Subsequently, Great Western failed to pay an
annual installment and the Yons began a foreclosure action. 79
Great Western cross-claimed against RF Investment alleging
default on its contract for deed. 0
Language in the preliminary drafts of the contracts for deed
providing for specific performance on default were deleted from the
final drafts of the contracts. 81 Great Western and RF Investment
asserted, therefore, that specific performance should not be an
available remedy to the Yons.8 2 They further asserted that
foreclosure is so similar to specific performance that the trial court
should allow it, and that Yon's sole remedy should be termination
of the contract and repossession of the property. 3 The trial court
granted Yon's motion for summary judgment.8 4 The court
concluded that Yon's agreement not to exercise specific
performance did not preclude them from exercising the remedy of
foreclosure.85
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision. 86 The
court noted initially that the language of the contract's default
01-04 (1982). The court found that Peterson's guarantee was an original obligation and, therefore,
did not have to bt in writing. 338 N.W.2d at 71.
75. 338 N.W.2d at 71.
76. Yon v. Great Western Dev. Corp., 340 N.W.2d 43, 44 (N.D. 1983).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 45.
79. Id.
80. Id. The trial court noted that technically, Great Western could not enter into a contract for
deed with RF Investment since it did not hold title to the property. The trial court concluded,
nevertheless, that Great Western's right to foreclose was clear and, therefore, deemed the cross-claim
sufficient. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 47.
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provision was unambiguous.8 7  Therefore, the trial court
improperly admitted extrinsic evidence pertaining to the specific
performance language contained in the preliminary drafts of the
contracts.8 8 The court further concluded that silence in the default
provision with respect to remedies other than termination does not
render the contract ambiguous and does not limit the remedies
available to the seller.8 9
In dicta the court stated that even if the Yons had agreed not to
exercise the remedy of specific performance they would not have
been precluded from exercising the remedy of foreclosure. 90 The
court reasoned that, unlike foreclosure, specific performance is
available only when the legal remedy of damages is inadequate. 9
Further, under specific performance the relief requested is the
entire balance of the contract. In a foreclosure action the remedy is
the balance owing under the contract unless a jury, in a separate
deficiency proceeding, determines a deficiency exists. 92
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen
In Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen9 3  Dickinson
Newspapers, Inc. and other news media challenged an order of the
county court that a preliminary hearing be closed to the press. 94
The news media argued that the preliminary. hearing was required
by the North Dakota9 5 and United States Constitutions9 6 to be open
to the public and the press, except in limited circumstances; and
that by closing the preliminary hearing without giving adequate
reasons, the county court abused its discretion. 9 7 The supreme
court stated that the right of access to judicial proceedings was
limited by the constitutional right to a fair trial. 98 The court,
therefore, ruled that the county court judge did not abuse his
87. Id. at 46.
88. Id. at 45-46. The court stated that extrinsic evidence should be considered only'when the
language of the agreement is ambiguous and such a determination is a question of law. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 47.
93. 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983).
94. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72, 74 (N.D. 1983).
95. See N.D. CoNsr. art. I, §§ 9,'12.
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. 338 N.W.2d at 74-75.
98. Id. at 76.
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discretion in ordering that the preliminary hearing be closed to the
press. 9 9
Judge Jorgensen issued an order closing the preliminary
examination ofJohnJ. Huber'00 after Huber, with the concurrence
of the state's attorney, requested the closing order. 10 1 Petitioners
were not parties in the preliminary examination proceedings, but
were allowed to intervene because their request was a matter of
vital concern to the public.10 2 The supreme court, however, in-
dicated that the failure to include the real party in interest as a par-
ty respondent may be justification for denying standing to sue.10 3
North Dakota allows a discretionary closing of the preliminary
examination. 104 The court noted that a preliminary hearing differs
from a trial or pretrial proceeding in that the prosecution's
evidence may include hearsay and other prejudicial testimony,
including evidence obtained by illegal means. 10 5 Such prejudicial
testimony, if made public before trial, may violate the accused's
constitutional right to a fair trial.10 6 The court found that the sixth
amendment to the federal constitution and the North Dakota
constitutional provisions providing that all courts shall be open do
not apply with the same force and effect to preliminary hearings as
they apply to trials. 10 7 Further, the court noted that the
constitutional right to a public trial is primarily for the benefit of
the defendant.10 8 Thus, the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial could not be overshadowed by the rights of the public,
including the news media. 109
The court determined that the press had no constitutional
right of access to a preliminary hearing. 110 The press does not
occupy a special status distinct from the general public.11' The
news media, therefore, could properly be denied access to
preliminary examinations." 2 The court emphasized that the
closure of a preliminary hearing does not make it secret 13 and that
99. Id. at 81.
100. Id. at 74. Huber was charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted
murder. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103 Id. In Dickinson Newspapers .theparty in interest was Huber. Id.
104. Id. at 76. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-07-14 (1983); N.D.R. CRIM. P. 5, 51 (1981).
105. 338 N.W.2d at 75.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 79.
109. Id. at80.
110. Id. at 77.
111. Id. at 79.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-07-14 (1983).
113. 338 N.W.2d at 76, 78.
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the record will usually be available to the public after the case has
been dismissed or a jury has been selected for trial. 114
The supreme court found that the remedies available to Huber
other than the closure of his preliminary hearing were correctly
examined and rejected by Judge Jorgensen. 115 The court
determined that Judge Jorgensen did not act in an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. 116 Therefore, the court
held that the closure order issued by Judge Jorgensen was
proper. 117 Petitioner's stay of the preliminary hearing was vacated
and their petition for a supervisory writ was denied. 18
In a special concurring. opinion, Justice Pederson wrote that
Dickinson Newspapers overruled KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe'1 9 to the
extent that KFGO held that the North Dakota Constitution 120
required all proceedings in court to be open. 121
State v. Dilger
In State v. Dilger122 Dilger appealed from a judgment entered
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of murder. 123 Dilger
murdered the woman with whom he had been living, after she
embarrassed him at a local bar. 124 After murdering her, he
returned to the bar and told patrons that he just killed the
woman. 125
Dilger moved to suppress all the statements he made to law
enforcement officers on the ground that he had not been adequately
advised of his Miranda12 6 rights and that, even if adequately
informed of his rights, the statements were not voluntarily made. 127
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion holding that when the evidence of voluntariness of a
confession is conflicting the supreme court will not disturb the trial
court's holding unless it is "manifestly against the weight of
the evidence. "128 Utilizing a totality of the circumstances
114. Id. at 76.
115. Id. at 79-80.
116. Id. at 80.
117. Id. at 81.
118. Id.
119. 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980).
120. N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 9.
121. 338 N.W.2d at 81 (Pederson, J., concurring).
122. 338 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983).
123. State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 88 (N.D. 1983).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127. 338 N.W.2d at 89.
128. Id. The court relied on its previous holdings in State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706, 710
(N.D. 1977) and State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665, 677 (1947).
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approach, the supreme court noted that the police read Dilger his
rights a number of times and that each time he indicated that he
understood them and that no evidence of wrongdoing existed. 129
The court also considered Dilger's contention that the ten
month delay between his arraignment and trial deprived him of his
right to a speedy trial. 130 The court stated that four factors were
relevant in determining whether a delay violated the right to a
speedy trial: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; the
defendant's assertion of his right; and the prejudice that the delay
caused the defendant.13' The court noted that the delay in this case
occurred in part because the State filed an interlocutory appeal
from the order suppressing photographs of the murder scene, which
appeals are ordinarily not considered in speedy trial claims. 132 In
addition, the court found that Dilger neither asserted his right to a
speedy trial nor had he shown any prejudice resulting from the
delay. 133 The court also found that, because extreme emotional
disturbance was not a statutorily designated defense to murder, the
State need not prove its nonexistence in order for the jury to return
a murder conviction.' 3 4 The court indicated that the trial court
instructed the jury that the State must prove each element of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury should
consider extreme emotional disturbance and reasonable
justification. 135 Since the instruction was a proper statement of the
law, the supreme court found that no cognizable claim of error
existed. 136
State v. Eugene
In State v. Eugene137 Eugene appealed from a jury verdict
finding him guilty of burglary. 138 Police took certain items of
evidence into custody, which were lost before trial.139 The police
offered no explanation for the loss. 140
The supreme court held that under the circumstances of this
129. 338 N.W.2d at 90.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court relied on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and State v. Erickson, 241
N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976) in formulating this test.
132. 338 N.W.2d at 91-92.
133. Id. at 92.
134. Id. at95.
135. Id. at 95-96.
136. Id. at 96.
137. 340 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1983).
138. State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18, 22 (N.D. 1983).
139. Id. at 23.
140. Id.
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case the loss of the physical evidence did not impinge on Eugene's
due process right to a fair trial.1 4 1 The court stated that the
application of the rule of Brady v. United States142 extended to cases in
which the requested evidence was lost or discarded by the State. 143
The supreme court held, however, that the State's duty to preserve
evidence arises only after the State knows, or has reason to know,
that the evidence is, or is claimed to be, material and
exculpatory. 144
The supreme court noted that evidence of previous
convictions, even if not automatically admissible under Rule 609
(a)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, may still be
admissible under Rule 609 (a) (1) if the trial court determines "that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant.' '145 The supreme court stated that it could not
say, as a matter of law, that the trial court failed to meaningfully
exercise the discretion given it by Rule 609 (a) (1).146
The supreme court found no merit in Eugene's contention
that the trial court erred in granting him only one day credit for
time served prior to his sentencing in this case.1 47 The court
revoked Eugene's suspended sentence for a previous conviction
following his arrest in connection with the burglary at the
restaurant. 148  The court held that credit for time served in
connection with unrelated charges based on conduct other than that
for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced is inappropriate. 149
State v. Freed
In State v. Freed150 the State appealed from an order suppressing
141. Id. at 28.
142. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Brady rule provides that "suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. United
States, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
143. 340 N.W.2d at 26. The North Dakota Supreme Court first extended the Brady rule to cases
in which requested evidence was lost or discarded by the State in State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750,
753-54 (N.D. 1981).
144. 340 N.W.2d at 27. In Eugene there was no indication that the State had reason to know
Eugene believed the lost items of evidence were exculpatory. Id.
145. Id. at 33. Rule 609 (a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
N.D.R. EvID. 609(a).
146. 340 N.W.2d at 33.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 340 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1983).
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the results of chemical tests of a blood sample taken from Freed
following an automobile accident.151 Freed moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the prosecuting attorney failed to comply
with section 29-28-07 (5) of the North Dakota Century Code, which
requires an attorney to file a statement with a notice of appeal. 152
The State requested leave to file the required statement. 153 Freed
argued that the requirement that an attorney file a statement with a
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and, thus,
compliance should not be waived. 154 The supreme court declined to
rule that the requirement was jurisdictional, 155 but stated that the
court could impose sanctions, including dismissal, for failure to
comply with the statute. 156
The State contended that its appeal should not be dismissed
because of the preferred policy of deciding an appeal on its
merits. 157 The State also argued that in previous cases the supreme
court had not dismissed appeals for failure to file statements in
compliance with section 29-28-07 (5) of the North Dakota Century
Code. 58 The supreme court acknowledged that in the past it had
not dismissed appeals for failure to file the required statements, but
noted that in each case it expressed its disapproval and issued a
warning that the requirement should not be ignored. 159 The
supreme court stated that since the requirement had been in effect
for more than five years and the court had repeatedly admonished
state's attorneys in the past for noncompliance, it could no longer
permit the rule to be disregarded. 160  The court, therefore,
dismissed the appeal. 161
State v. Halvorson
In State v. Halvorson162 Halvorson appealed from judgments
151. State v. Freed, 340 N.W.2d 172, 173 (N.D. 1983). Freed moved to suppress the results of
the blood test on the grounds that the blood sample was taken without his consent or a search
warrant, and that the sheriff had not informed him that he was under arrest while he was in the
emergency room. Id. at 174.
152. Id. at 173. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 29-28-07(5) (Supp. 1983).
153. 340 N.W.2d at 174. The State contended that case law supported the view that mere failure
to file a statement does not warrant dismissal of an appeal, particularly when the content of the
statement has not been challenged. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 37(c); N.D.R. App. P. 3(c).
156. 340 N.W.2d at 174.
157. Id. at 175.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 176.
161. Id. The dissent urged that a less harsh sanction than dismissal of the State's appeal, such as
comprehensive training sessions for state's attorneys, would be less disruptive of the judicial system
and would support the public's interest in the prosecution of criminal cases. Id. (Erickstad, C. J.,
dissenting).
162. 340 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1983).
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convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor 163 and escape. 164 Halvorson raised
three issues on appeal: whether he was under the influence of
alcohol to an extent that impaired his ability to operate a motor
vehicle, 165 whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal, 166 and whether clear and convincing
evidence sustained his convictions. 167
The supreme court stated that Halvorson misapprehended the
nature of the DWI charge.168 The court noted that objective and
direct evidence of impairment of a defendant's driving ability
because of intoxication was not required. 169 The court stated that
the prosecution must prove only two elements to sustain a DWI
charge: that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a public
way and that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to an
extent that he did not possess clearness of intellect and control of
himself. 170
The court indicated that a motion for judgment of acquittal
can be granted only if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for the offense. 171 Furthermore, the court stated that its
review is not based upon the clear and convincing evidence
standard. 172 Rather, the court, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict, determined whether there was substantial
evidence to support the conviction. 173 Thus, the court held that the
trial court did not err in denying Halvorson's motion for judgment
of acquittal1 74 and that there was substantial evidence to support
Halvorson's convictions. 175
State v. Hilsman
- In State v. Hilsman176 Hilsman appealed his conviction of two
counts of robbery. 177 Hilsman alleged that the trial court erred by
163. State v. Halvorson, 340 N.W.2d 176, 177 (N.D. 1983). See N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-08-01
(Supp. 1983).
164. 340 N.W.2d at 177. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-08-06 (1976).
165. 340 N.W.2d at 177.
166. Id. at 178. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (1983).
167. 340 N.W.2d at 178.
168. Id. at 177-78.
169. Id. at 178 (citing State v. Salhus, 220 N.W.2d 852, 856 (N.D. 1974)).
170. 340 N.W.2d ati178 (citing Salhus, 220 N.W.2d at 856.).
171. 340 N.W.2d at 17ff.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 333 N.W.2d 411 (N.D. 1983).
177. State v. Hilsman, 333 N.W.2d 411, 411 (N.D. 1983). Hilsman was convicted of two counts
of robbery, which included the theft of $191.00 from the Econ-O-Inn on November 30, 1981 and
$300.00 from the General Store on December 14, 1981. Id. at 414.
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restricting the defense counsel's cross-examination of the State's
chief witness to test the witness's credibility, 178 and by precluding
the defense counsel from attempting to impeach the credibility of
an individual who did not testify at Hilsman's trial. 179
With respect to the cross-examination issue, the supreme court
noted that, under Rule 608(b) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence, a trial court has the discretion to allow a party to
impeach a witness with regard to certain conduct that did not result
in a conviction if that conduct was probative of a witness's
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 180 The court found
that whether the witness was accused of theft was not probative of
his veracity or honesty, and further that mere accusations of a
crime could not be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.1 81
The court held, therefore, that the trial court committed no error
by limiting the scope of cross-examination. 182
The supreme court next considered the defendant's second
allegation that the trial court erred by precluding defense counsel
from attempting to impeach the credibility of an individual who
was not a witness for either the State or the defense. 183 The
defendant again contended that Rule 608(b) of the North Dakota
178. Id. at 412.
179. Id. Hilsman raised two minor issues. First, Hilsman alleged that the State's reference to a
polygraph examination in its closing argument constituted reversible error. Id. at 413. A trial court
has discretionary control over the scope of counsel's opening and closing arguments. Id. The
supreme court will not overturn a trial court on the basis that counsel's arguments were excessive
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. The court noted that when the prosecutor mentioned
"polygraph" in his closing argument, he was referring to the jury instructions. Id. The court found
that this did not exceed the permissible scope of his closing argument. Id.
Second, Hilsman contended that the State's evidence against him was entirely circumstantial
and did not sustain the jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. At the trial court
circumstantial evidence must be conclusive and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. Id. at 414. The role of the appellate court, however, is "merely to review the record to
determine if there was competent evidence that allows the jury to draw an inference reasonably
tending to prove guilt, and fairly warranting a conviction." Id. The supreme court, upon reviewing
the record, found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Hilsman was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
180. Id. at 414. See N.D.R. EViD. 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. However, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, they may be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
Id.
181. 333 N.W.2d at 412. Aaron Stein was the principal witness for the state. Id. The court noted
that without his testimony a conviction would not have been likely. Id. The defense counsel was
prevented from destroying his credibility by cross-examining him with regard to his being accused of
stealing a shotgun. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 412-13. Brian Stein and Aaron Stein were brothers. Id. at 412 n.1. They lived with
Hilsman from the end ofJuly until the 19th or 20th of November 1981. Id.
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Rules of Evidence allowed him to attack a witness's credibility
through cross-examination with regard to specific instances of
conduct. 84  The court, however, found that defense counsel
unlawfully attempted to impeach, through the use of extrinsic
evidence, the credibility of an individual who was not a witness for
either the State or the defense. 1 5 Subsequently, the supreme court
held that the trial court committed no error. 186
State v. Klose
In State v. Klose187 the State appealed from an order dismissing
a DUI charge against Klose. 188 The State raised two issues on
appeal: whether the county court had the legal authority to amend
the initial complaint on a motion by Klose' 8 9 and whether the
double jeopardy provisions of the United States and North Dakota
Constitutions applied to the county court's acceptance of Klose's
guilty plea to the reduced charge. 190
The supreme court stated that the county court did not have
the authority to amend the complaint to charge a lesser offense
without the consent or request of the prosecution.' 91 The supreme
court concluded that since Klose initiated and pursued the action
precipitating the error by the court, of which Klose now complains,
he could not use it to his advantage by claiming that the double
jeopardy provisions applied. 192 Therefore, the court reversed the
order dismissing the DUI charge and remanded the case.193
State v. Leidholm
In State v. Leidholm 94 Janice Leidholm was charged with
184. Id. at 412-13.
185. Id. at 413. Hilsman contended that the trial court erroneously prohibited him from
subpoenaing the sheriff of Williams County who allegedly would have testified that Brian Stein had
committed a theft and, as a result, was fired as a deputy sheriff. Id. at 412-13.
186. Id. at 413.
187. 334 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1983).
188. State v. Klose, 334 N.W.2d 647, 648 (N.D. 1983). Klose moved to amend the complaint to
reduce the charge to actual physical control. Id. The motion was granted and Klose pleaded guilty.
Id. The state then filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Id. The motion was granted and the case
was set for trial on the original charge. Id. Klose again moved to amend the complaint. Id. The
district court concluded that the county court originally acted without authority in amending the
initial complaint, but found that Klose had been placed in jeopardy because the county court
accepted his guilty plea, and therefore the district court dismissed the charge. Id.
189. Id. at 648-49. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 3(b), 7(e) (amendment of complaint).
190. 334 N.W.2d at:'650. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 12 (double
jeopardy).
191. 334 N.W.2d at 649.
192. Id. at 652.
193. Id.
194. 334 N.W.2d811 (N.D. 1983).
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murder for the stabbing death of her husband, Chester Leidholm.
According to testimony, the Leidholm marriage was filled with a
mixture of alcohol abuse, moments of kindness, and moments of
violence. 195 At trial the defense offered jury instructions on self-
defense based on the theory of battered women syndrome. 196 The
trial court refused to include the proposed instructions; rather, it
utilized the reasonable and prudent person standard and found
Janice Leidholm guilty of manslaughter. 97 Leidholm appealed
alleging several errors. 198 The controlling issue was whether the
trial court correctly instructed the jury on self-defense. 199
The supreme court first explained the basic operation of the
law of self-defense in North Dakota. 20 0 The court noted that the
North Dakota Century Code failed to state whether North Dakota
adheres to the objective or subjective standard of reasonableness. 20 1
The court found guidance on this issue from past decisions, noting
that in 1907 the North Dakota Supreme Court unanimously
decided to accept the subjective standard because the court believed
it to be a more just standard than the objective standard. 20 2 As late
as 1974, the court confirmed that early decision. 20 3 Thus, the
factfinder must view the circumstances attending an accused's use
of force from the standpoint of the accused to determine whether
the circumstances were sufficient to create an honest and
reasonable belief in the accused's mind that the use of force was
necessary to protect herself from imminent harm. 20 4
The trial court, in its statement of the law of self-defense, used
the reasonable and prudent person standard. 20 5 The supreme
court, therefore, concluded that the trial court's instruction was a
misstatement of the law of self-defense. 20 6 A correct statement of
the law would view the circumstances from the standpoint of the
defendant alone rather than from the standpoint of a reasonable
and prudent person. 20 7 The court further found that nothing in the
proposed jury instructions, based on the theory of battered women
syndrome, would add to or significantly alter a correct instruction
195. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,813 (N.D. 1983).
196. Id. at 819.
197. Id. at 818, 819.
198. Id. at 814.
199. Id.
200. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-05-03 (1976).
201. 334 N.W.2d at 817.
202. Id. (citing State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 113 N.W.374 (1907)).
203. 334 N.W.2d at 817. See State v. Jacob, 222 N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 1974).
204. 334 N.W.2d at 817-18.
205. Id. at 818.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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on the law of self-defense.208 Thus, it concluded that the trial court
need not include a specific instruction on battered women
syndrome in its charge to the jury when the instruction was
modeled after North Dakota's present law of self-defense. 20 9
State v. Metzner
In State v. Metzner210 the State appealed from the district court's
order granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 211 In
Metzner a federal agent and other law enforcement agents made a
warranted arrest of the defendant, a convicted felon, for a violation
of the federal firearms law. 212 Concomitant with the arrest, the
officers made a warranted entry into the defendant's house and a
search pursuant to that warrant revealed three firearms, including
the rifle described in the search warrant, and marijuana. 213 The
district court suppressed the evidence based on its determination
that probable cause did not exist to believe that the rifle sought in
the federal agent's affidavit would be found in the defendant's
home.214 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the motion to
suppress should not have been granted because the magistrate
performed his function in determining whether there was probable
cause in a nonarbitrary manner. 21 5
The supreme court relied on the holding in United States v.
Green, 2 16 which stated that a nexus must exist between the house to
be searched and the evidence sought. 21 7 The affidavit must contain
facts and circumstances that would warrant a reasonable man to
believe that the articles sought were located at the place to be
searched.218 Notwithstanding the recognition that determinations
of probable cause often fall into a gray area in which reasonable
persons might justifiably come to different conclusions, the court in
Metzner chose to resolve the doubt in favor of sustaining the
208. Id. at 820.
209. Id.
210. 338 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1983).
211. State v. Metzner, 338 N.W.2d 799, 800 (N.D. 1983).
212. Id. at 802-03.
213. Id. at 803.
214. Id. at 804. The district court stated that there were no facts which indicated that the rifle
had been removed from the defendant's vehicle and brought into his home other than the
magistrate's opinion in his affidavit that "people usually do." Id.
215. Id. at 804-05. See Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 863 (5th Cir. 1973). The court in
Bastida stated that a magistrate's judgment concerning whether facts alleged in an affidavit constitute
probable cause for issuance of a warrant is conclusive in absense of arbitrariness. Id.
216. 634 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1981).
217. 338 N.W.2d at 804 (citing United StatSs v. Green, 634 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1981)).
218. 338 N.W.2d at 804-05. See United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977).
The court in Maestas stated that evidence that a defendant had stolen material, which one would
normally expect him to hide at his residence, would support a search of his residence. Id. at 1180.
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magistrate's judgment and search.21 9 Accordingly, the court held
that the evidence should not have been suppressed because a
magistrate could logically have concluded that the information
contained in the affidavit satisfied the test of probable cause and
warranted a legitimate search within the scope of the fourth
amendment. 220
State v. Morris
In State v. Morris221 the appellants, Gail John Wanner and
Clayton Virgil Morris, were charged with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver in violation of section 19-03.1-23
(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.2 22 The trial court found
Wanner guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and
Morris guilty of possession of less than one-half ounce of
marijuana. 223 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions. 224
The appellants first contended that the trial court erred in
allowing the arresting officers to give expert testimony pursuant to
Rule 702 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 225 The court,
however, expressed the opinion that Rule 702 should be given an
expansive interpretation. 226 The court stated that "an experienced,
well-trained, and knowledgeable law officer may give his opinion
that a certain quantity of marijuana would normally be possessed
for purposes of sale rather than for personal use." ,227
Next, the appellants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
used to convict them. The court reaffirmed its holding in State v.
Rippley228 and held that "constructive possession" of the controlled
substance was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the statute. 229
219. 338 N.W.2d at 805. The court stated that there was no "bright line" test by which tojudge
the sufficiency of an affidavit. Id.
220. Id.
221. 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1983).
222. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 51 (N.D. 1983). See N.D. CENT. ConE S 19-03.1-23(1)(Supp. 1983). Section 19-03.1-23(1) provides in part, "Except as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a
controlled substance.'
Id.
223. 331 N.W.2d at 51.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 53. See N.D.R. EvaD. 702. Rule 702 provides that "if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
226. 331 N.W.2d at 53.
227. Id.
228. 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982).
229. 331 N.W.2d at 53. The court stated that the State did not have to show either that the
accused had knowledge of the drug's presence, or that the accused had knowledge of the substance's
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In addition the court stated that "constructive possession or the
ability to exercise dominion and control over a controlled
substance, can be inferred from the totality of circumstances
associated with a particular case." ' 230  In determining whether
constructive possession exists, the court enumerated several factors
that trial courts may consider. These include (1) "an accused's
presence in the place where a controlled substance is found," (2)
"his proximity to the place where it is found," and (3) "the fact
that the controlled substance is found in plain view. "231
Morris also argued that section 19-03.1-23(3)232 was
constitutionally infirm because it violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States and North Dakota
Constitutions233 by creating "a strict liability offense which may
result in the conviction of a person without knowledge of his
possession of a controlled substance, and therefore without any
conscious or calculated wrong doing." ' 234 The court, however,
would not entertain this issue because Morris could not show that
the statute was unconstitutional as it was applied to him. 235 The
court noted that there were numerous other factors that pointed
toward his guilt and that he had knowledge of the presence of the
controlled substance in the van, thus negating his contention that
he had been convicted on the basis "of his innocent act of being
present in a vehicle that contained a controlled substance.' '236
identity. Id. at 54. "The evidence required to show an individual's power and capability to exercise
control over a controlled substance need only establish his right or his ability to control, in a realistic
and practical sense, the area where, or the container in which, the contraband was found.'" Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(3) (Supp. 1983). Section 19-03.1-23(3) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was
obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise
authorized by this chapter; provided, that any person whose conduct is in violation of
section 12-46-24, 12-47-21, or 12-51-11 shall not be prosecuted under this subsection.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class C felony; except that any
person who violates this subsection regarding possession of one-half ounce [14.175
grams] to one ounce [28.35 grams] of marijuana, shall be guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and any person, except a person operating a motor vehicle, who
violates this subsection regarding possession of less than one-half ounce [14.175
grams] of marijuana shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Any person who violates
this subsection regarding possession of less than one-half ounce [14.175 grams[ of
marijuana while operating a motor vehicle shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Id.
233. 331 N.W.2d at 58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 1.
234. 331 N.W.2d at 58.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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State v. Novak
In State v. Novak2 37 the appellant was convicted for being in
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol. The appellant contended that his conviction was beyond'
the scope of the statute under which he was charged. 23 8 Novak was:
arrested after being found asleep at the wheel of his running
automobile parked at the edge of a country field. 239 On appeal he
claimed that section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
applied only to drivers on state highways or other public or private:
areas open to the public. 240
The supreme court noted that whether the "actual physical!
control" statute applied to vehicles on private property was an issue
of first impression. 241 The court concluded that section 39-10-01,
which extended the coverage of laws relating to driving under the
influence to "highways and elsewhere throughout the state,''242
also applied to the prohibitions contained in section 39-08-01.243
Thus the court affirmed the conviction. 244
The supreme court rejected Novak's assertion that the specific
provisions of section 39-08-01 should control the general provisions
of section 39-10-01.245 This rule of construction was proper, the
court stated, only if the statutes in question were irreconcilable. 246
The court further found support for its holding in subsequent
legislative amendments to section 39-10-01, clarifying the section's
application to all of title 39 of the North Dakota Century Code. 247
State v. Skjonsby
In State v. Skjonsby248 Skjonsby appealed for post-conviction
237. 338 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 1983).
238. State v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 637, 638 (N.D. 1983). See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-01-01(2) (b)
(Supp. 1983). For the version of this statute in effect at the time of Novak's arrest, see 1981 N.D.
Sess. Laws 1130.
239. 338 N.W.2d at 638.
240. Id. Section 39-08-01 then provided in part: "No person shall drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public
has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if: . . .He is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor .... " N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(b)(Supp. 1981).
241. 338 N.W.2d at 639.
242. See N.D. CENT. CODE 39-10-01 (1980) for the statute in effect at the time of Novak's
arrest.
243. 338 N.W.2d at 640. The supreme court found that any other construction would defeat the
legislature's intent to protect the public from drunken drivers, wherever they might be found. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 639. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1975) (if provisions conflict and effect cannot be
given to both, the specific provision controls over the general).
246. 338 N.W.2d at 639.
247. Id. at 640 & n.2. See 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 1374.
248. 338 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1983).
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relief pursuant to chapter 29-32 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 24 9 Skjonsby was convicted of murder and attempted murder
and the supreme court had previously affirmed the convictions. 250
Skjonsby applied to the district court for the post-conviction relief
and requested that the court set aside his convictions and grant a
new trial.251 The district court summarily denied Skjonsby's
application without a hearing. 252 The supreme court found that the
allegations made in Skjonsby's application raised significant issues
of material fact, 253  and therefore held that the district court's
summary disposition of Skjonsby's application was inappropriate
and that Skjonsby was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the
issues. 254
In his application for post-conviction relief, Skjonsby alleged
that he was denied effective legal assistance at his murder trial
because his attorneys were involved with perjured testimony given
by a witness at the trial.255 Skjonsby also alleged that he was unable
to effectively assist in his own defense because his diminished
physical, mental, and emotional condition at the time of trial
rendered him incapable of making rational decisions. 256 The
district court denied Skjonsby's application because the judge
determined that Skjonsby was fully competent at trial to assist in his
249. State v. Skjonsby, 338 N.W.2d 628, 628 (N.D. 1983). Chapter 29-32 of the North Dakota
Century Code is North Dakota's cofidication of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act.
Section 29-32-01 provides that a proceeding to secure relief will be available for anyone who has been
convicted of a crime and who claims:
a. That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
b. That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
c. That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
d. That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard,
that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest ofjustice;
e. That his sentence has expired, that his probation, parole, or conditional release has
been unlawfully revoked, or that he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or
other restraint; or
f. That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any
ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or
other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy;
N.D. CENT. CooE 5 29-32-01 (1974).
250. State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1982).
251. 338 N.W.2d at 628.
252. Id. North Dakota Century Code § 29-32-06 provides that a court may grant a motion for
summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief if it appears from the documents
submitted that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no
genuine issue of material fact. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-06(3) (1974).
253. 338 N.W.2d at 630.
.254. Id. at 631.
255. Id. at 629. Skjonsby alleged that his attorneys fabricated the testimony that Charlotte
Skjonsby gave at trial. Id. Charlotte Skjonsby later pleaded guilty to perjury in connection with her
testimony at the trial. Id.
256. Id. Skjonsby claimed that various drugs and medications administered to him while he was
incarcerated clouded his thinking and increased his susceptibility to the pressures of his counsel. Id.
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own defense.2 5.7 The district court further found that Skjonsby
knowingly embraced the fabricated testimony given at trial.258
The supreme court indicated that Skjonsby's application and
supporting evidence raised issues of fact about his competence to
stand trial at the time he was convicted. 259 The supreme court held
that when an application for post-conviction relief raises an issue of
material fact, section 29-32-06 of the North Dakota Century Code
requires the district court to hold a full evidentiary hearing. 260
Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing.2 61
State v. Walden
In State v. Walden2 62 Walden appealed his conviction of
attempted sexual imposition. 263 Walden raised three issues on
appeal: whether he was actually advised of his Miranda rights; 264
whether his written confession was voluntary; 265 and whether the
State's evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. 266
Although the State conceded that Walden was not fully
advised of his rights, 267 the court held that the defendant was
estopped from asserting infringement because he interrupted the
officer during the reading of the Miranda warnings.2 68 The State
had made a reasonable effort to comply with the dictates of
Miranda.269 The court also held that Walden's waiver of his right to
remain silent and his subsequent statement were voluntary because
he was in control of his faculties, despite Walden's claim that he
was tired, intoxicated, and coerced by police. 270  Finally, the
supreme court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
Walden's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.271
257. Id. at 630. The district judge made these conclusions based on his own observations of
Skjonsby during the trial and psychiatric evaluations of Skjonsby made prior to trial, Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-32-06(2) (1974). Section 29-32-06(2) provides that a
summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief is not proper if a material issue of
fact exists. Id.
260. 338 N.W.2d at 631. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-06 (1974).
261. 338 N.W.2d at 631. The supreme court noted that it was not expressing any views on the
credibility of Skjonsby's allegations. Id. at 630-31. The court merely believed that SkJonsby was
entitled to a hearing on his application. Id. at 630.
262. 336 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1983).
263. State v. Walden, 336 N.W.2d 629, 631 (N.D. 1983).
264. Id. at 631.
265. Id. at 632.
266. Id. at 633.
267. Id. at 631.
268. Id. at 632.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 633.
271. Id. at 634.
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Although there was some conflicting evidence regarding whether
Walden had taken a substantial step toward committing a sexual
act or was merely attempting to knock the phone from the victim's
hand, 27 2 one of the conflicting inferences reasonably tended to
prove guilt and fairly warranted a conviction. 27 3 The court,
therefore, affirmed Walden's conviction. 27 4
State v. Wingerter
In State v. Wingerter275 the defendant was convicted of escape
from "official detention" pursuant to section 12.1-08-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 276 Section 12.1-08-06 provides that a
person is guilty of escape from official detention when he is
detained in a facility "under a law authorizing civil commitment in
lieu of criminal proceedings or authorizing such detention while
criminal proceedings are held in abeyance. "277
The defendant in Wingerter threw a tire iron through a window
of a local residence while he was receiving mental health
treatment. 27 The assistant state's attorney suggested that the police
file a petition for civil commitment rather than go ahead with
criminal prosecution, even though she had a very strong case. 279
The defendant was subsequently committed to the North Dakota
State Hospital, where he later used force to escape. 280 On appeal
Wingerter asserted he could not be charged with escape because he
was not in official detention. 281 The defendant argued that he was
not in official detention because no criminal charge had been filed
with regard to the tire iron incident; there was nothing in his
commitment papers to indicate that he had been committed in lieu
of criminal proceedings or that criminal charges were being held in
abeyance; and there was nothing in his medical records at the State
Hospital to indicate that he was committed because of an alleged
criminal act. 2812 The supreme court agreed with the defendant's
contention that for him to be in official detention some kind of
documentation was necessary to show that he was committed in
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 334 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1983).
276. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-06(3)(a) (1976).
277. Id.
278. State v. Wingerter, 334 N.W.2d 475, 476 (N.D. 1983).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 476-77.
[VOL. 60:325350
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
lieu of criminal proceedings. 283
Noting that due process requires that a defendant be given
notice of forbidden conduct, the court concluded that the lower
court must specifically determine that the civil commitment was in
lieu of criminal proceedings or criminal proceedings were held in
abeyance.2 84 The court noted that considerable doubt as to this
issue would be eliminated if the legislature enacted "a statute
specifically authorizing civil commitment in lieu of criminal
proceedings or authorizing civil commitment while criminal
proceedings are held in abeyance.' '285 Thus, the court reversed the
defendant's criminal conviction. 2 86
DAMAGES
Blair v. Boulger
In Blair v. Boulger287 Blair appealed a judgment awarding
Boulger $2500 compensatory damages and $5000 exemplary
damages for Blair's intentional interference with contractual
relations between Boulger and Blair's mother. 288 Blair contended
that the trial court's award of compensatory damages represented
compensation for attorney's fees and therefore was improper. 289
Boulger argued that the $2500 award did not represent an award of
attorney's fees, but even if it did, the award was proper as a "third
party" exception 290 to the general rule that an award of attorney
fees are not permitted. 291
The court noted that although attorney's fees may not be
awarded as an element of damages in the absence of contractual or
statutory authority, sound reasoning and good judgment supported
recognition of some form of the third-party exception. 292 The court
283. Id. at 477.
284. Id. at 477-78.
285. Id. at 478 (footnote omitted).
286. Id. at 479.
287. 336 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1983).
288. Blair v. Boulger, 336 N.W.2d 337, 338 (N.D. 1983).
289. Id. at 339. See Hage v. Burleigh County Water Management Dist., 331 N.W.2d 23, 31
(N.D. 1981) (as a general rule, attorney's fees are not recoverable as an item ofdamages).
290. 336 N.W.2d at 339. The court noted:
The exception, sometimes called the "third party" exception, states that where
the wrongful acts of one party, (A), cause another, (B), to bring or defend an action
against a third party, (C), then (B) in a later action against (A) may recover the costs
of litigation, including attorney fees, incurred by (B) in bringing or defending the
earlier action against (C) which was the direct result of(A)'s wrongful act.
Id. at 339-40. (citing Campus Sweater & Sportswear v. M. B. Kahn Const., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C.
1979)).
291. 336 N.W.2d at 339.
292. Id. at 340.
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stated that the person seeking to recover attorney's fees under the
third-party exception must have been forced to bring or defend an
earlier action against a third party. 293 Examining the facts in the
case before it, the court found that the third-party exception was
applicable. 294 The court stated that as long as the wrongful acts of a
person caused another to become involved in litigation with a third
party, the expense of litigation against the third party may be
recovered from the wrongdoer regardless of whether the action to
recover attorney's fees is brought in the same proceeding, or as in
the instant case, in a subsequent proceeding. 295 Blair contended
that since he was a party to the action, the third-party exception
should not apply. 296 The court found that he was not a party to the
original contract on which the action was based; thus, the third-
party exception was applicable.2 97
Halvorson v. Voeller
In Halvorson v. Voeller298 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
addressed the issue of whether evidence of a motorcyclist's failure
to wear a protective helmet was admissible on either the issue of
liability or damages. 299 Halvorson received severe brain injury
when his motorcycle collided with Voeller's automobile. 300
Halvorson was not wearing a protective helmet. 30 1 At trial the jury
found Voeller 92 percent negligent and awarded Halvorson
$2,767,324.61 in damages.3 0 2 Voeller was not allowed to present
evidence that Halvorson's failure to wear a protective helmet was a
cause of the accident and contributed to his head injuries.3 0 3
On appeal the supreme court held that evidence of
Halvorson's failure to wear a protective helmet was admissible to
reduce his damage award if competent testimony by a qualified
expert that the use of a helmet would have lessened his injuries
existed .3 04 On the issue of liability, the court held that evidence of a
293. Id. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 914 (stating general proposition in support of
third-party exceptions).
294. 336 N.W.2d at 340.
295. Id. See, e.g., Wauen v. McLauth Steel Corp., 111 Mich. App. 496, _., 314 N.W.2d 666,
672(1981).
296. 336 N.W.2d at 340-41.
297. Id. at 341.
298. 336 N.W.2d 118(N.D. 1983).
299. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 119 (N.D. 1983).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 121.
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failure to wear a helmet was not admissible unless the facts of the
particular case indicated that the failure was a contributing cause of
the accident. 30
5
The trial court reasoned that to admit evidence of,,the nonuse
of a helmet would create a common law duty to wear a helmet when
no statutory duty existed. 30 6 The supreme court disagreed, and
stated that the lack of a statutory duty did not preclude the creation
of a duty by the judiciary through well-recognized principles of
law. 30 7 The court noted that comment c to section 465 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts allowed apportionment of damages
when the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a substantial
contributing factor to the ensuing harm, notwithstanding the fact
that the plaintiff was not a cause of the accident. 30 8 The court stated
that under the doctrine of avoidable consequences a plaintiff's
failure to use a safety device in mitigation of damages would allow
apportionment of damages regardless of whether the plaintiff's
negligence preceded or succeeded the defendant's negligence. 30 9
The court cautioned that admission of evidence of the nonuse
of a helmet must be preceded by a jury determination that a
reasonable person exercising ordinary care would have worn a
helmet to avoid injury in the event of an accident. 310 Only after that
determination, accompanied by competent expert testimony,
might the evidence be admitted. 311 If the evidence showed that the
use of a helmet would have reduced the plaintiff's injuries, the jury
must reduce any damage award to the extent a helmet would have
lessened the injuries incurred. 12 The burden of proving that a
305. Id.
306. Id. at 119.
307. Id. at 122.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 120 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 65, at 423-24 (4th ed.
1971)).
310. 336 N.W.2d at 121.
311. Id.
312. Id. The court used the following hypothetical to demonstrate proper procedure for reducing
a damage award:
Assume: X, driving a car, and Y, driving a motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent liable for causing the accident,
making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent liable for causing the accident. The jury also
finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his injuries if he had worn a helmet;
therefore, X is 40 percent liable for causing Y's injuries. Y proves $100,000 in
damages.
On the basis of these findings, the $100,000 award should be reduced by 40
percent, which accounts for Ys contributing to the cause of the accident. Hence, the
award is diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the extent that "s injuries would have
been less had he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves a total award
of $24,000.
Id. at 121-22 n.2.
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reasonable person would have worn a safety helmet and that the
failure to wear a helmet increased the injuries incurred was on the
defendant. 313
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Aaker v. Aaker
In Aaker v. Aaker3 14 a husband and a wife were divorced on
April 13, 1972. The divorce judgment gave the plaintiff-wife
custody of the parties' child and ordered the defendant-husband to
pay child support in the sum of $50 a month until the child's
eighteenth birthday, until the child was legally adopted, or until
further order of the court. 315 Almost eleven years later, the wife
requested the court to increase the child support from $50 to $250
per month and to order the defendant to be responsible for all of the
minor child's medical, dental, and optical expenses. 316 The parties
made a tentative stipulation to increase the support obligation to
$100 per month. 31 7 The trial court entered an order requiring the
husband to pay $100 per month initially, to be increased to $150
per month at a later date. The husband appealed. 318
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the stipulation
of increase in child support obligation to $100 per month was
constructively accepted by the parties, even though customary
formal acceptance was not accomplished. 319 The supreme court
also held, however, that the trial court erred in increasing the
support obligation to $150 per month without first giving notice to
the parties of its intention to modify the stipulation. 32 0
The supreme court indicated that since neither party had
denied the existence of the stipulation, the court would assume that
the parties agreed to the stipulation. 32 ' The court acknowledged
that the district court had the authority to either accept or reject a
313. Id. at 121.
314. 338 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1983).
315. Aaker v. Aaker, 338 N.W.2d 645, 646 (N.D. 1983).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 647. The supreme court said that oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the
court are generally binding, especially when acted upon or entered in the court's records. Id. Such a
stipulation need not be signed by the parties or their attorneys. Id.
320. Id. at 648. If the stipulation does not affect the public and is ofa private nature, ajudge has
greater liberty to accept it. Id. However, a judge can only add to it after informing the parties
beforehand. Id.
321. See N.D. RULES OF COURT 11.3 (1983) (stipulations are binding when made in open court
and read into record).
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stipulation. 322 Adding to the stipulation without first informing the
parties or obtaining their consent, however, was another matter.3 23
Had the parties been told that the court would add further financial
and other requirements, they would have been in a position to
submit additional evidence supporting the stipulation and provide
reasons for entering into the stipulation.3 24 The supreme court,
therefore, remanded and ordered the trial court to amend the
judgment to conform to the stipulation. 325
ELECTION LAW
Haugland v. Meier
Lips v. Meier
Haugland v. Meier
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently defined the limits
of what can be contained in state referendum petitions. The
petitioners in Haugland v. Meier (Haugland I),326 Lips v. Meier, 327 and
Haugland v. Meier (Haugland II)328 sought review of the decision of
the Secretary of State approving two referendum petitions. In
Haugland I the petition sought referral of a house bill changing the
name of Minot State College to Dakota Northwestern
University. 329 In Lips the petition called for the referral of a senate
bill that gave the state control and funding responsibility for three
junior colleges. 330 Haugland II involved a petition that designated
the next general election as the period for North Dakotans to decide
322. 338 N.W.2d at 647. The court noted that the settlement of disputes should be encouraged
whenever possible. Id. at 647-48. See 15A AM. JuR. 2D Compromise and Settlement S 5 (1976).
323. 338 N.W.2d at 647.
324. Id. at 648.
325. Id. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to amend the
judgment to allow for $100 per month plus one-half of all medical and dental expenses of the child.
Id.
326. 335 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1983).
327. 336 N.W.2d 346 (N.D. 1983).
328. 339 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1983).
329. Haugland v. Meier, 335 N.W.2d 809, 810 (N.D. 1983). The plaintiffs in Haugland I
challenged the following provision of the referendum: " 'House Bill No. 1500 would rename Minot
State College to Dakota Northwestern University. This would increase the number of universities in
the state from two to three; with commensurate increases in state funding responsibilities.' " Id. at
811.
330. Lips v. Meier, 336 N.W.2d 346, 346 (N.D. 1983). The plaintiffs in Lips attacked the
following portion of the referendum:
Senate Bill 2073 would take threejunior colleges (BismarckJunior College, University
of North Dakota-Williston Center, and Lake Region Community College) now under
the control of local school districts and put them under the control of the North Dakota
Board of Higher Education. The burden of financing these institutions would then
become the responsibility of the State of North Dakota.
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the college name-change issue. 331
The supreme court in Haugland I noted that Article III of the
North Dakota Constitution reserves to the people the power to refer
legislative acts for their rejection or approval. 332 Relying on the
decision of McCarney v. Meier,333 the North Dakota Supreme Court
asserted that it is not bound by the Secretary of State's
interpretation of the constitution because the secretary's
determination of the propriety of the petition was a ministerial
act. 334 The Haugland I court determined that the inclusion of the
extraneous material in the petition would "open the process to
misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan
tactics. " 3 15 The supreme court concluded that the Secretary of
State erred in failing to disapprove the petitions because they
contained the extraneous statement of intent. 336
The North Dakota Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in Lips. 337 The court noted that Article III of the North
Dakota Constitution specifies that all decisions of the Secretary of
State in regard to referendum petitions shall be subject to review by
the court. 338 Relying on Haugland I, the supreme court again
concluded that "[i]t was therefore improper for the secretary of
state to decline to consider the extraneous statement contained in
the Statement of Intent in this case." ,339
The supreme court in Haugland II upheld the Secretary of
State's approval of the amended Haugland I petition. 340 The
Haugland II court noted that the challenged provisions of the
petition should have been eliminated, even though the statements
were not extraneous statements of intent. 34 1 The court, however,
held that the sponsors' good faith submission of the petition,
erroneous reliance upon prior case law, and lack of time in which to
331. Haugland v. Meier, 339 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1983). The statement in Haugland I specified
that the referendum be held at the next primary election. Id. at 102.
332. 335 N.W.2d at 810. See N.D. CONST, art. III.
333. 286 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979).
334. 335 N.W.2d at 811. The Haugland court declared, " 'Under the principle of separation of
powers, courts do not substitute their judgment for that of an executive officer who has exercised a
discretionary function. [citation omitted]. That has no application, however, to ministerial acts.'
Id. (quotingMcCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 783).
335. 335 N.W.2d at 811.
336. Id.
337. 336 N.W.2d 346 (N.D. 1983).
338. Id. at 348. See N.D. CONST. art. III §§ 6-7.
339. Id. at 347 (quoting Hauglandl, 335 N.W.2d at 811).
340. 339 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1983).
341. Id. at 106. Specifically, the petitioners challenged the portion of the amended petition
which specified that the measure be placed on the ballot of the next general election, and the
provision which stated that each petition contained signatures from more than two percent of the
state's population. Id. at 105-06.
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make corrections or amendments constituted a form of excusable
neglect that required approval of the amended petition. 342
State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken
In State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken343 the Grand Forks county auditor
and canvassing board appealed from a district court decision
ordering a special election limited to voters whose votes were not
counted in the general election. 344 The issues raised were whether
the district court could properly direct a new election limited to 526
voters whose votes were not counted 345 and whether the district
court could direct the governor to order the new election. 346
The petitioners contended that the North Dakota Constitution
gave each house power to decide whether the election of a member
of its house was valid. 347 The court agreed that each house has the
final authority to decide its membership. 348 The court concluded,
however, that the district court did have jurisdiction and could
properly entertain election results. 349 The supreme court decided
that the district court could not order the governor to hold a special
election if the governor was not a party to the contest. 350 The court
held that in this case the district court had jurisdiction to direct the
county auditor, not the governor, to conduct a special election. 351
GOVERNMENT
American Federation of State, County &Municipal Employees v. Olson
In American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
Olson352 American Federation (Union) appealed from a district
342. Id. at 107. The Haugland II court warned that the repetition of similar errors in the future
would not qualify as a form of excusable neglect. Id.
343. 329 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1983).
344. State ex rel Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d 575, 577 (N.D. 1983). The controversy arose
during the 1982 North Dakota House of Representatives election for District 42. Because of
improper use of a ballot label, 526 votes were cast mistakenly. The race was close enough that had
the 526 votes been counted a different outcome could have resulted. Id. at 576.
345. Id. at 577.
346. Id. at 579.
347. Id. at 577. Petitioners referred to art. IV, S 26 of the North Dakota Constitution. See N.D.
CONST. art. IV, S 26. Article IV, S 26 provides, "Each house shall be thejudge of the election returns
and qualifications of its own members." Id.
348. 329 N.W.2d at 579.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 581.
351. Id. at 582.
352. 338 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1983).
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court's summary judgment that denied State Highway Department
employees an eight percent pay raise. 353 The Union previously
obtained the pay raise under a collective bargaining agreement
with the State Highway Commissioner. 354 The Union alleged as
erroneous the lower court's decision that, absent specific statutory
authority, the State Highway Commissioner was without actual or
implied authority to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement. 35  The Union further alleged that, because the
legislature provided for salary increases for state employees by
appropriating funds for their pay increases, the Governor's act of
cancelling the raises was an unconstitutional veto under the North
Dakota Constitution. 35 6
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision and held
that the agreement between the Union's bargaining representative
and the Highway Commissioner was void. 357 The court stated that
it was well settled that public officials had only such authority as
they were expressly given. 358 The court stated that public
employees were specifically exempted from North Dakota's laws
authorizing private sector collective bargaining through
representatives. 359-After noting that the attorney general gave the
Union notice that the agreement was void, 60 the court took judicial
notice of the. legislature's repeated refusals to enact legislation
mandating collective bargaining for public employees. 361 In
dispensing with the constitutional issues, the court characterized
the legislative appropriations as creating mere expectations, the
denial of which fall far short of the harm required for relief in the
courts. 362 Based on its past definitions of appropriations, 363 the
court concluded that the appropriations in question did not
mandate that state employees receive salary increases. 364
353. American Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97,99 (N.D.
1983).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 100.
356. Id. at 99 (citing N.D. CONST. art. V, 5 10).
357. 338 N.W.2d at 102.
358. Id. at 100 (citingKopplin v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 942, 47 N.W.2d 137 (1951)).
359. 338 N.W.2d at 101. See N.D. CENT CODE ch. 34-12 (1976) (North Dakota's Labor-
Management Relations Act).
360. 338 N.W.2d at 100.
361. Id. at 102 n.1. (citing H.B. 1448, 48th Leg. Sess., 1983. S. B. 2420, 47th Leg. Sess., 1981;
H.B. 1663, 46th Leg. Sess. 1979; H.B. 1471, 45th Leg. Sess., 1977).
362. 338 N.W.2d at 102-03.
363. SeeMenz v. Coyle, 117 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1962).
364. 338 N.W.2d at 103.
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INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES
Olson v. Molacek Brothers
In Olson v. Molacek Brothers365 Olson appealed from a summary
judgment granted in favor of the Molaceks. Olson brought suit
alleging that the Molaceks had knowingly sold diseased cattle to
him in violation of North Dakota statutory law366 and, therefore,
were liable for damages under theories of strict liability and
negligence.3 67  The Molaceks claimed that the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), codified at title 41 of the North Dakota
Century Code,3 68 applied and preempted the statutory law relied
upon by Olson.
The supreme court held that the applicable provisions of the
UCC were subordinate to statutory laws regulating sales to farmers
or consumers, or other specified classes of buyers.3 69 The court
noted that even if the Molaceks were correct in their claim, they
failed to comply with the provision on which they relied. 370 This
noncompliance also made the matter inappropriate for summary
judgment. 371
365. 341 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1983).
366. Olson v. Molacek Bros., 341 N.W.2d 375, 377 (N.D. 1983). Olson relied upon S 36-14-01
of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides:
No person shall sell, give away, or in any manner part with any animal infected with
or suspected of being infected with any contagious or infectious disease, except as may
be provided otherwise by the rules and regulations of the state livestock sanitary
board. If any animal is known to have been infected with or exposed to any such
disease within one year prior to such disposal, due notice of such fact shall be given in
writing to the person receiving the animal.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 36-14-01 (1980).
367. 341 N.W.2d at 377. Olson relied upon 5 36-14-22 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which provides that "[e]very person violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be
liable in a civil action .... " N.D. CENT. CODE S 36-14-22 (1980).
368: 341 N.W.2d at 377. The Molaceks relied upon S 41-02-33(3)(e) of the North Dakota
Century Code, which states that no implied warranty of fitness arises out of a sale of cattle if the seller
has complied with all state and federal animal health regulations. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-
33(3)(e) (1983).
369. 341 N.W.2d at 378. The Olson court applied 5 41-02-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in goods; it
does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional
contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor
does this chapter impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers,
or other specified classes of buyers.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-02 (1983) [U.C.C. S 2-102 (1978)].
370. 341 N.W.2d at 378-79.
371. Id. at 379.
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State v. Backer
In State v. Backer"72 the district court ordered the confiscation
and sale of Backer's vehicle, which he used in violation of game and
fish laws. 373 The district court found that Backer was an "alleged
offender" within the provisions of section 12.1-10-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code.3 74  On appeal Backer contended that
according to section 12.1-10-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code a person must be charged with a violation of game and fish
laws before in rem jurisdiction over the confiscated property could
be obtained. 375 Because no person was formally charged with a
violation of game and fish laws, according to Backer, the district
court had no jurisdiction over the confiscated vehicle. 376
The supreme court held that the game and fish laws did not re-
quire that an alleged offender be charged with a violation of title
20.1 as a prerequisite to the confiscation and sale of property used
in violation of the statute. 37 7 The court stated that the procedure for
the confiscation and sale of a vehicle used in violation of game and
fish laws was an in rem proceeding in which the vehicle was both
the res and the defendant. 3 7 In addition to the district court having
jurisdiction over the vehicle, the district court complied with the
statutory requirements of sections 20.1-10-01 and 20.1-10-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code, thus giving the district court
authority to order the confiscation and sale of Backer's vehicle. 379
372. 331 N.W.2d4 (N.D. 1983).
373. State v. Backer, 331 N.W.2d 4, 5 (N.D. 1983). See generally N. D. CENT. CODE tit. 20.1
(1978 & Supp. 1983) (game and fish laws).
374. 331 N.W.2d at 5. See also N.D. CENT. CODE §21.1-10-01 (1978).
375. 331 N.W.2d at 5. Backer argued that because the term "alleged offender" was used in
§ 20.1-10-01 instead of the term "owner," a court must obtain in personam jurisdiction over an
alleged offender in order to obtain in rem jurisdiction over the confiscated property. Id. Backer
argued that he must first be formally charged with a violation of the game and fish laws in order to be
considered an alleged offender. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 6. The court stated that the term "alleged offender" was used in title 20.1 because
the owner and alleged offender might not be the same person. Id. The court stated, "Bringing the
'alleged offender' before the court for the purpose of determining disposition of confiscated property
ensures that an individual with a sufficient nexus to the alleged offense is given an opportunity to be
heard prior to the disposition of the unlawfully used property." Id.
378. Id. The confiscation of the vehicle, or the issuance of a receipt assuring delivery before the
court, was the equivalent of process and gave a court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense
jurisdiction over the res. Id. at 7.
379. Id. The court stated that, although it was not a prerequisite to a court's obtaining in rem
jurisdiction over confiscated property, the requirement that an alleged offender be brought before a
court to determine disposition of property might be a prerequisite to a court-ordered sale of the
property. Id. In addition, the owner of the property must have been given notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Id. Because Backer was both the alleged offender and owner of the vehicle and was given
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the district court could properly order the confiscation and
sale of his vehicle. Id.
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Winkler v. Gilmore & Tatge Manufacturing Co.
In Winkler v. Gilmore & Tatge Manufacturing Co. 380  Kent
Manufacturing (Kent) appealed from a judgment directing Kent to
pay attorney's fees and costs incurred by Gilmore while defending a
products liability action brought by Richard Winkler for injuries he
suffered when he fell from a grain dryer ladder. 38 1 Kent raised three
issues: whether a manufacturer is obligated to provide a defense for
a seller under the provisions of section 28-01.1-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code when the manufacturer is liable and the
seller is free of fault; 382 whether a seller who is also a manufacturer
is precluded from seeking indemnity from another manufacturer;
and whether the questing of a seller's right to indemnity should be
presented to the jury or determined by the court. 383
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment and held that the statute authorizes a seller to recover its
costs of defense from a manufacturer in a products liability action
only after the trier of fact finds the manufacturer liable and
attributes none of the fault to the seller. 38 4 The court further held
that the definition of "seller" contained in the North Dakota
Products Liability Act 38 5 included a manufacturer who was also a
380. 334 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1983).
381. Winkler v. Gilmore & Tatge Mfg. Co., 334 N.W.2d 837, 838 (N.D. 1983). Winkler
brought suit for personal injuries and consequential damages against Kent, a manufacturer of grain
dryers; Gilmore, a seller; Dakon, Inc., a distributor; and Hausauer Implement, a retail seller. Id.
The jury attributed 50% of the cause of damages to Hausauer Implement, 36% of the cause of
damages to Kent, and 14% to Winkler. Id.
382. N. D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-07 (Supp. 1983). Section 28-01.1-07 provides:
Indemnity of seller. If a products liability action is commenced against a seller, and
it is alleged that a product was defectively designed, contained defectively
manufactured parts, had insufficient safety guards, or had inaccurate or insufficient
warnings; that such condition existed when the product left the control of the
manufacturer; that the seller has not substantially altered the product; and that the
defective condition or lack of safety guards or adequate warnings caused the injury or
damage complained of; the manufacturer from whom the product was acquired by the
seller shall be required to assume the cost of defense of the action, and any liability that
may be imposed on the seller.
Id.
383. 334 N.W.2d at 839.
384. Id. at 841.
385. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-06 (Supp. 1983). Section 28-01.1-06 provides in relevant part:
For purposes of ... section 28-01.1-07:
1. "Manufacturer" means a person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates,
produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a
product prior to the sale of the product to a user or consumer. The term includes any
seller who has actual knowledge of a defect in a product or a seller of a product who
creates and furnishes a manufacturer with specifications, relevant to the alleged defect,
for producing the product or who otherwise exercises some significant control over all
or a portion of the manufacturing process or who alters or modifies a product in any
significant manner after the product comes into his possession and before it is sold to
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seller and that a manufacturer could seek indemnity from another
manufacturer as long as that manufacturer-seller did not exercise
control over the design and manufacture of the defective
product.3 86 The court also held that the question of a seller's right
to indemnity could be submitted to the jury in the form of a special
verdict, 387 but if the parties did not demand that the issue go before
the jury, the court might properly determine the issue. 318
The Winkler court determined that whether a seller was also a
manufacturer depended on whether the seller exercised control
over the design and manufacture of the product. 389 The court found
that the evidence presented at trial showed Gilmore did little more
than place its private label on the product. 390 Therefore, Gilmore
could properly be considered a seller for purposes of indemnity. 391
Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the trial
court erred in not allowing the jury to decide whether Gilmore was
a seller. The court found that Kent failed to submit a proposed
question and to demand that the issue go before the jury. 392 The
court concluded that it was proper for the trial court to make a
finding on that issue pursuant to the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. 393
LIABILITY
Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
In Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 394 Schlenk appealed
the ultimate user or consumer. The term also includes any seller of a product who is
owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer or who owns, in whole or
significant part, the manufacturer. A seller not otherwise a manufacturer shall not be
deemed to be a manufacturer merely because he places or has placed a private label on
a product if he:
a. Does not otherwise specify how the product shall be produced; or
b. Does not control, in some significant manner, the manufacturing and process of
the product, and the seller discloses the actual manufacturer.
3. "Seller" means any individual or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler,
distributor, or retailer, who is engaged in the business of selling or leasing any product
for resale, use, or consumption.
Id.
386. 334 N.W.2d at 841-42.
387. Id. at 842. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 49 (a) (special verdicts).
388. 334 N.W.2d at 842.
389. Id. at 841.
390. Id. at 842.
391. Id.
392.1d. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 49(a). Rule 49(a) provides that if the court omits any issue of fact
raised by the evidence each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless
before thejury retires he demands its submission to thejury. Id.
393. 334 N.W.2d at 841. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 49 (a) (special verdicts).
394. 329 N.W.2d 605 (N.D. 1983).
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to the supreme court seeking recovery for injuries sustained when
he was entangled in a wire winder machine.3 95 At the time of his
injury, Schlenk was employed by Aerial Contractors, Inc., an
independent contractor hired by Northwestern Bell (Bell).3 96
Schlenk raised the issue of whether Bell was liable for his injuries
based upon an exception to the general rule of employer
nonliability for acts or omissions of its independent contractor. 397
The supreme court examined the four exceptions to the
general rule of employer nonliability raised by Schlenk. 398 The first
exception that the court examined was whether Bell should be
vicariously liable for Schlenk's injury because the operation of the
wire winder was peculiarly risky and inherently dangerous. 399 The
court determined that in order to meet the peculiar risk
requirement, the risk must be likely to arise in the ordinary and
reasonable method of doing work. 400 The court concluded that the
evidence revealed that the risk to Schlenk was not inherent or
peculiar to the ordinary operation of the wire winder but arose out
of improper use by Schlenk. 40 1
The second exception to the employer nonliability rule
examined by the court was the contention by Schlenk that Bell had
a nondelegable duty40 2 to ensure that the wire winder was operated
in a safe manner.40 3 The nondelegable duty arises by statute or
administrative regulation. 404 The court determined that the statute
or regulation 40 5 that Schlenk contended imposed a duty on Bell was
merely advisory and imposed no duty.406
The third exception examined by the court was whether Bell
395. Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 329 N.W.2d 605, 606 (N.D. 1983).
396. Id. at 606.
397. Id. at 607.
398. Id. at 608.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 610.
401. Id. At the time of the injury, Schlenk was operating the wire winder by himself. Id. The
ordinary manner of operating the wire winder was to have two workers operate the machine. Id.
402. Id. at 611. Section 424 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide
specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the
others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a
contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 424 (1965).
403. 329 N.W.2d. at 611.
404. Id.
405. Id. Schlenk maintained that the statute or regulation set forth in S 432 (C) (4) of the
National Electrical Safety Code of the American National Standards Institute, Inc., imposed the
nondelegable duty. Section 432 (C) (4) provides, "Employees should avoid contact with moving
winch lines, especially near sheaves, blocks, and take-up drums." NAT'L ELEC. SAFETY CODE
5 432(c)(4).
406. 329 N.W.2d at 611.
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was liable based upon its negligent exercise of retained control.4 0 7
The court determined that Bell's retention of supervisory controls
was not sufficient to impose direct liability. 40 8
The fourth exception examined by the court was Bell's direct
liability based upon the negligent selection of Aerial Contractors,
Inc. 40 9 The court determined that to render an employer liable for
negligently selecting an independent contractor a party must
establish that, at the time of hiring, the employer had knowledge
that the independent contractor was incompetent. 410  No such
evidence existed in this case. 41I Thus, the court held that the
evidence did not establish that Bell owed a duty to Schlenk under
any exceptions to the general rule of employer nonliability. 411
MENTAL HEALTH
In re Ebertz
In In re Ebertz413 Ebertz appealed from an order of the county
court for alternative outpatient treatment at South Central Human
Services Center in Jamestown. 41 4  Ebertz was committed on
February 26, 1983 under the emergency commitment procedures
of section 25-03.1-25 of the North Dakota Century Code. 41 5 Two
days later, after a conference with Michael Schmidt, Ph.D., Ebertz
voluntarily admitted himself to the State Hospital for treatment. 41 6
407. Id. at 611-12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965). Section 414 provides:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of
any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety
the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to
exercise his control with reasonable care.
Id.
408. 329 N.W.2d at 613.
409. Id. Exceptions to the general rule of employer nonliability in negligence actions is found in
411 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides:
An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor
(a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and
carefully done, or
(b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965).
410. 329 N.W.2d at 614.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 333 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1983).
414. In re Ebertz, 333 N.W.2d 786, 787 (N.D. 1983).
415. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-03.1-25 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-25 provides for
detention or hospitalization emergency procedures. Id.
416. 333 N.W.2d at 787.
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On March 14, 1983 Ebertz executed a written request for
release. 417
The superintendent of the State Hospital postponed the release
until involuntary commitment proceedings were held. 418 The
petition for involuntary commitment was filed March 15, 1983 and
the hearing was held in Stutsman County Court on March 16,
1983.419 Ebertz raised two issues: whether the county court
improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the petition filed
on March 16, 1983 was not filed within twenty-four hours of his
emergency commitment as required by North Dakota Century
Code section 25-03.1-26(1)42o and, in the alternative, whether the
emergency commitment proceedings violated his rights.421
The supreme court held that while procedures in civil
commitment and criminal cases were similar in that they embraced
concepts of due process, the purposes and objectives were
different. 422 Civil commitment was to benefit the individual and the
general public; therefore, the supreme court ultimately was
concerned with whether the respondent required commitment. 423
The court found that the county court did not err by refusing to
dismiss the petition for involuntary commitment because the focus
was on whether due process was afforded in the involuntary
commitment hearing and thus, the issue of whether the emergency
procedures were violated was not relevant to the inquiry. 424
In re Kupperion
In In re Kupperion425 a patient in a state mental hospital, using a
recently enacted expedited appeal procedure, 42 6 appealed his
involuntary commitment for treatment. 427 Kupperion, the patient,
417. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-03.1-06 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-06 provides a right to
release from treatment facilities upon application. Id.
418. 333 N.W.2d at 787.
419. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-03.1-23 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-23 provides for
petitions for continuing treatment orders. Id.
420. 333 N.W.2d at 787. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-26 (1) (Supp. 1983).
421. 333 N.W.2dat 787.
422. Id. at 788.
423. Id. The purposes and objectives of criminal cases are to protect the public, punish
criminals, deter crimes, and develop respect for the laws. Id.
424. Id. at 789. The supreme court stated that if due process were not afforded in the
involuntary commitment hearing a new hearing must be held, unless the county court determined
that the respondent was not in need of treatment or involuntary commitment and was to be released.
Id.
425. 331 N.W.2d22 (N.D. 1983).
426. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-03.1-29 (Supp. 1983). The statute more clearly expresses the notice
and appeal procedures for person involuntarily committed than the former statute. Compare N.D.
CENT. CODE S25-03.1-29 (1978).
427. In re Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22, 23 (N.D. 1983). Kupperion had voluntarily committed
himself to the hospital. Id. at 24. When he petitioned for his release, a hospital official sought and
obtained an order of involuntary commitment from the Stutsman County Court. Id.
1984]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
raised two issues: whether the supreme court had commenced a
hearing of his appeal within fourteen days of his filing of notice of
expedited appeal as required by section 25-03.1-29 of the North
Dakota Century Code; 428 and whether there was clear and
convincing evidence to support the county court's finding that he
was mentally ill and in need of treatment. 429
The supreme court, in a case of first impression, concluded
that the statutory fourteen-day period for commencement of an
expedited appeal hearing began to run when notice of the appeal
was filed with the clerk of the supreme court. 430 Kupperion had
argued that the period began to run with the filing of notice of
appeal in county court. 431 The court rejected Kupperion's first
contention, noting that his interpretation could lead to
unreasonably short pre-hearing preparation periods.4 32 Therefore,
the court held that the hearing had commenced within the statutory
period in the instant case. 433
On the second issue, the supreme court concluded that the
county court's finding that Kupperion was mentally ill and in need
of treatment was a finding of fact, and not a conclusion of law. 434
On appeal the supreme court noted that it would set aside a trial
court's finding of fact only when clearly erroneous. 435 The
Kupperion court held that in the present case the county court's
finding of mental illness and the need for treatment was, in view of
the evidence presented, not clearly erroneous. 436 Therefore, the
supreme court affirmed the decision of the county court. 437
In re Nyflot
In In re Nyflot438 the County Court of Cass County
involuntarily committed Cynthia Jewel Nyflot to the Jamestown
State Hospital. 439 She appealed that decision, but the Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's ruling. 440
On August 23, 1983, Nyflot's parents filed a petition for her
428. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-03.1-29 (Supp. 1983).
429. 331 N.W.2d at 24. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-03.1-29 (Supp. 1983).
430. 331 N.W.2d at 25.
431. Id. at 24.
432. Id. at 25.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 27.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 28.
437. Id.
438. 340 N.W.2d 178 (N.D. 1983).
439. In re Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178, 180 (N.D. 1983).
440. Id. at 184.
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involuntary treatment. 4 1 A preliminary hearing was held in which
the court found probable cause to believe Nyflot was in need of
treatment and ordered that she be detained up to fourteen days at
the Jamestown State Hospital.4 42
At the hospital she was examined by a staff psychiatrist, Dr.
Cabuso, who concluded that Nyflot was mentally ill and presented
a serious risk of harm to herself, others, and property. 443 Dr.
Cabuso petitioned the court for an order for involuntary treatment
of Nyflot pursuant to section 25-03.1-22 of the North Dakota
Century Code.4 44 At the subsequent trial Nyflot was ordered to
undergo involuntary treatment for a period not to exceed ninety
days. 445
On appeal Nyflot presented four issues.4 6 The first issue was
whether the petition for involuntary treatment should be dismissed
because the petitioner failed to have the respondent examined by an
expert examiner. 447 The court held that, although Dr. Cabuso was
not a licensed psychiatrist at the initial examination, the majority of
the interviews with Nyflot were conducted after Dr. Cabuso's
licensure. 4 18 The respondent also contended that Dr. Cabuso was
not "board certified" as a psychiatrist.4 4 9 The court dismissed this
contention also, because the court read North Dakota law as not
requiring certification.4 50 Dr. Cabuso was a licensed physician
specializing in psychiatry, which is all the statutes require. 451
The second issue raised by the respondent was whether the
county court lost jurisdiction over the matter by its failure to hold
441. Id. at 180.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-03.1-22 (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-22 provides in
relevant part:
If, prior to the expiration of the ninety-day order, the director or superintendent
believes that a patient's condition is such that he continues to require treatment,
the director or superintendent shall, not less than fourteen days prior to the
expiration of the order, petition the court where the facility is located for
determination that the patient continues to be a person requiring treatment and for
an order of continuing treatment, which order may be for an unspecified period of
time....
Id.
445. 340 N.W.2d at 180.
446. Id.
447. Id. Section 25-03.1-02 (6) of the North Dakota Century Code requires that "an evalution
of the respondent's mental status shall be made only by a licensed psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist." N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (6) (Supp. 1983).
448. 340 N.W.2d at 181.
449. Id.
450. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-03.1-02 (6) (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-02 (6) requires
that an "expert examiner" be a licensed psychiatrist. Id.
451. 340 N.W.2d at 181. Dr. Cabuso was employed as a staff psychiatrist at a South Dakota
institution for twelve and one-half years. Id.
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the treatment hearing within fourteen days after the preliminary
hearing. 45 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court looked at legislative
intent in order to construe section 25-03.1-19 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which requires a treatment hearing to be held
within fourteen days of the preliminary hearing.4 53 The court
determined that the statute reflected a balance between the due
process rights of the respondent and the respondent's possible need
for treatment and society's interest in ensuring that the treatment is
forthcoming.4 54 The court concluded that a construction of the
word "shall" as directory rather than mandatory most accurately
reflected the intent of the legislature and effectuated the purpose of
the legislation. 455 The court noted that the final treatment hearing
in this case was continued for "good cause." 4 56
The third issue considered by the court related to Dr.
Cabuso's failure to include in her report to the county court a clear
explanation of how she arrived at the conclusion that Nyflot was a
''person requiring treatment. ''451 The respondent contended that
Dr. Cabuso's report contained no explanation concerning why
Nyflot was a "person requiring treatment" and failed to state why
she presented a "serious risk of harm" to herself, or the community
as required by section 25-03.1-11 (2) of the North Dakota Century
Code. 458 The respondent maintained that these failures on the part
of Dr. Cabuso denied her notice of the particular issues to be
determined at the hearing. 459 The supreme court held that the
respondent did have adequate notice because the determination
rested on the respondent's willful and overt acts, which clearly
demonstrated a "serious risk of harm" to the respondent and to the
community. 460 The court found that the due process requirement of
notice was not affected by the omissions in Dr. Cabuso's report.4 6
452. Id. Respondent cited State ex re. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis.2d 325, 320 N.W.2d
27 (Ct. App. 1982). In Gerhardstein the court held that a Wisconsin statute similar to the one at issue
in Nyflot was mandatory rather than directory and that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
respondent because of its failure to hold a final commitment hearing within fourteen days of the
respondent's detention. 107 Wis.2d at -, 320 N.W.2d at 29.
453. 340 N.W.2d at 181.
454. Id. at 182.
455. Id. (citing State v. McMorrow, 332 N.W.2d 232, 234 n.2 (N.D. 1983); Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 254 (N.D. 1960)).
456. 340 N.W.2d at 183. The respondent's treatment hearing was delayed one day past the
statutory limit in order to provide the court with the assistance of an "expert examiner" and to
provide the respondent with the opportunity to test the expert's conclusions through cross-
examination. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 183-84. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-11 (2) (Supp. 1983). Section 25-03.1-11
(2) provides that the report is to contain "[a] conclusion as to whether the respondent meets the
criteria of a person requiring treatment, with a clear explanation of how that conclusion was derived
from the evaluation required." Id.
459. 340 N.W.2d at 184.
460. Id.
461. Id.
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The fourth contention raised by the respondent was that the
facts did not support the conclusion that she was a person requiring
treatment because she did not present a serious risk of harm. 46 The
court, however, found respondent's actions, which included start-
ing fires and cutting wire screens on windows, to be a sufficient in-
dication that the respondent presented a serious risk of harm to her-
self, others, and property. 463 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed
the order of the county court. 464
PROPERTY
Feiler v. Wanner
In Feiler v. Wanner465 Wanner appealed from a summary
judgment granted in favor of Feiler in an action by Feiler to quiet
title to the mineral rights of a tract of his farmland, which he had
sold to the state. 466 The deed conveying the tract contained a
mineral reservation clause. 467 The state purchased the tract in order
to acquire another tract of land that it needed for construction of a
highway, and subsequently sold the tract to Wanner. 468 The North
Dakota Century Code provides that fee simple title to land taken
for highway purposes does not include mineral rights. 469 The
supreme court stated that the issue critical to the determination of
the ownership of the mineral interests in the tract was whether the
state acquired the tract for highway purposes. 470
Wanner contended that the tract was purchased by the state
through a private sale rather than by eminent domain because the
tract was not necessary for highway right of way purposes. 471
Wanner contended that the state acquired fee simple title with the
ability to convey the mineral interests to Wanner. 472 The supreme
462. Id.
463. Id. Nyflot started two separate fires in the women's bathroom at the dormitory. Id. The
court did not find controlling her subjective intentions nor that little likelihood of harm existed. Id.
That she was willing to start fires to attract attention was enough for the court to find she did pose a
serious risk of harm to herself, others, and property. Id.
464. Id.
465. 340 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1983).
466. Feiler v. Wanner, 340 N.W.2d 168, 168-69 (N.D. 1983). The state sought acquisition of
approximately 48 acres of Feiler's farm for construction ofU.S. Interstate Highway 94, referred to as
tract 1. Id. The proposed path of the highway bisected Feiler's farm and rendered a
portion of the land, referred to as tract 2, inaccessible from the farmstead. Id. at 169. Following
negotiations, the parties agreed that the state would purchase both tracts 1 and 2 from Feiler. Id.
467. Id. The deed for tract 2 provided a mineral reservation clause that stated, "Subject to oil
and gas leases, if any, mineral reservations and utility line easements of records.' Id.
468. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-32 (1978).
469. 340 N.W.2d at 170. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 24-01-01.1 (16) (1978).
470. 340 N.W.2d at 170.
471. Id. at 171.
472. Id. at 170. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 24-01-18; -32 (1978).
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court rejected both of Wanner's arguments, 473 finding that the state
purchased the tract to expedite economical construction of the
highway. 474 The court reasoned that since the purchase of the tract
involved an element of compulsion, it was more similar to a
condemnation in eminent domain than a purchase of land.4 75
Thus, the supreme court was guided by the principle that, in
eminent domain proceedings, a statute should be construed to leave
the owner with the greatest possible estate.4 76 The court found
additional support for its decision in section 32-15-03.2 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides that no transfers of
property to the state for highway purposes shall include any interest
greater than an easement. 47  The court found that the state
acquired an easement that did not include the mineral rights to the
property.4 78 The court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial
court that the state could not transfer an interest greater than it had
and, thus, the rights to the mineral estate remained with Feiler.4 79
Malloy v. Boettcher
In Malloy v. Boettcher 8° the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed the issue of "[w]hether or not, in a deed of conveyance, a
reservation of a life estate unto a third party, who is a stranger to
the title of the property, is effective to convey the life estate to the
third party. 4 81 Previously, in Stetson v. Nelson, 482 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a reservation in a'deed to a third party
cannot effectively pass title .4 8 3 This holding was consistent with the
common law rule. 484
In Malloy the court rejected the common law rule and held that
the deed was effective to convey the life estate to the third party. 485
The court stated that the "primary purpose in construing a deed is
473. 340 N.W.2d at 170-71.
474. Id. at 170.
475. Id. at 171. Seealso, Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631 (1941).
476. 340 N.W.2d at 171. See Wallentinson v. Williams County, 101 N.W.2d 571, 575 (N.D.
1960).
477. 340 N.W.2d at 171. Seealso N.D. CENT: CODE32-15-03.2 (1976).
478. 340 N.W.2d at 171-72.
479. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority because in its opinion, tract 2 was not taken for
highway purposes. Id. at 172 (Wallace, DistrictJudge, dissenting).
480. 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983).
481. Malloy v. Boettcher, 314 N.W.2d 8, 8 (N.D. 1983). Clyde Boettcher was the sole owner of
the property. Id. He and his wife executed a deed that purported to reserve a life estate in the
property to his wife. Id.
482. 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962).
483. Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1962).
484. 334 N.W.2d at 8 (citing Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962)).
485. 334 N.W.2d at 9.
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to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the grantor. "486 The court
concluded that the grantor intended to reserve a life estate and to
hold otherwise would frustrate the grantor's intention. 487
Rippley v. City of Lincoln
In Rippley v. City of Lincoln488 plaintiff-landowners brought an
inverse condemnation action against the City of Lincoln alleging
the city's public-use-only zoning classification of their property
constituted a regulatory taking depriving the plaintiffs of all
reasonable use of their property, thus entitling plaintiffs to just
compensation under Article 1 Section 16 of the North Dakota
Constitution.4 8 9
The supreme court held that the City of Lincoln, by zoning the
Rippley's property only for public use, deprived plaintiffs of all
reasonable use of their property and, thus, constituted a regulatory
taking for which just compensation was required. 490 The court
stated that the city's restriction was onerous because the plaintiffs
could only sell the property to the party imposing the restrictions;
hence the Rippley's were at the mercy of Lincoln as to when, if
ever, Lincoln might purchase and use the property for public
purposes. 491 The court concluded that the City of Lincoln could
either formally condemn the property or continue the offending
regulation; but in either case the action must be sustained by
compensation. 492
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Anderson v. Shook
In Anderson v. Shook493 Anderson appealed from a summary
486. Id.
487. Id. at 10.
488. 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983).
489. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 506-07 (ND. 1983). Lincoln's "public use"
zoning ordinance limits property uses as follows:
(a) Education group;
(b) Public recreation;
(c) Utility service group;
(d) Buildings and necessary on-site facilities required for conduct of government; or
(e) sewerage treatment plant.
Id. at 507 & n.2. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 16.
490. 330 N.W.2d at 509. The court suggested, however, that use of inverse condemnation to
fight regulatory taking might not be appropriate in all situations. Id.
491. Id. at 508.
492. Id. at 511 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)).
493. 333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983).
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judgment based on the running of the two-year statute of
limitations in a medical malpractice action. 494 In 1975 Dr. Shook
treated Anderson for cancer through the use of external radiation
therapy. 495 In 1981 Anderson brought an action against Dr. Shook
and his employer, Radiologists, Ltd., alleging that the radiation
therapy was negligently administered resulting in permanent
injury. 496
The issue raised by Anderson on appeal was what knowledge
was required by the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case in order
to cause an action to accrue. 497 The court held that the statute of
limitations would begin to run when the plaintiff knows, or with
reasonable diligence should know, of her injury, its cause, and the
defendant's possible negligence. 498 The court further held that "the
limitation of an action against a physician or licensed hospital will
not be extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged
malpractice by a nondiscovery thereof. ' ' 499 The Anderson court
found that "the policies allowing a plaintiff to bring an action when
she [had] knowledge of her injury, its cause, and the possible
negligence of the physician or hospital [outweighed] those policies
that would bar a consideration of the merits of an action brought
within the six-year period from the time of the alleged negligent act
or omission. ',500
Prior to Anderson the North Dakota Supreme Court had
determined that the limitation period commenced to run against a
malpractice action from the time the act of malpractice with
resulting injury was, or by reasonable diligence could have been,
discovered. 50 1 The Anderson court went one step further in holding
that the plaintiff must additionally know of the cause of the injury
494. Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 709 (N.D. 1983). The Anderson court reversed and
remanded the case. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1983). North Dakota's statute of
limitations for malpractice is two years. Id. It begins to run at the time the cause of action accrues but
may not extend beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice. Id.
495. 333 N.W.2d at 709.
496. Id. The district court dismissed Anderson's complaint against the defendants because the
statute of limitations had run. Id.
497. Id. Anderson argued that the statute of limitations accrued at the time the plaintiff
discovered, or by reasonable diligence could discover, that she had been injured, that the injury was
caused by the treatment received, and that it was reasonably probable that the treatment was
negligently administered. Id. Anderson alleged that she did not discover that Dr. Shook might have
been negligent until 1980. Id.
498. Id. at 712. The court reasoned that the injustice of barring a plaintiff's claim before she
reasonably could be aware of it was obvious. Id.
499. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1983)).
500. 333 N.W.2d at 709. The court recognized the legislative policies behind the statute of
limitations rule, which included attempting to compensate all victims of medical negligence,
stimulating activity, and punishing neglect before faded memories, dead or unavailable witnesses,
and lost or destroyed evidence could cause difficulties in defending claims. Id.
501. 333 N.W.2d at 710 (citing Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1968)).
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and of the defendant's possible negligence before the cause of action
would accrue. 50 2
Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v. Bailey
In Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v. Bailey503 Phillips appealed from a
summary judgment dismissing a legal malpractice action on the
ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 504 The
malpractice suit attributed acts of malfeasance and nonfeasance to
Bailey while acting as Phillips' attorney. 50 5  The alleged
malfeasance consisted of Bailey wrongfully agreeing to the removal
of a railroad spur line serving Phillips' scrap iron business. 506 This
event allegedly took place during the week of August 6, 1978.507
The alleged nonfeasance consisted of Bailey wrongfully failing to
inform the Phillips of the railroad's plan to remove the spur line
until it was too late to do anything about it.508 The Phillips alleged
damage to their scrap iron business attributable to Bailey's acts of
malfeasance and nonfeasance. 50 9 The Phillips commenced the suit
on or after March 17, 1981.510 The district court granted a
summary judgment dismissing the suit on the ground that the suit
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 511
The Phillips court held that an issue of fact existed concerning
the time at which Phillips could have discovered the alleged injury
through reasonable diligence. 51 2 Therefore, the supreme court
reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the
matter for trial.51 3 The Phillips court recognized that the discovery
rule was first applied in malpractice in Iverson v. Lancaster.514 The
Phillips court saw no reason to extend the applicability of the six-
year discovery period to legal malpractice. 5 15
In Anderson v. Shook 516 the court recognized the injustice of
barring a plaintiff's medical malpractice claim before it could
502. 333 N.W.2d at 712.
503. 340 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1983).
504. Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1983).
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. The applicable statute of limitations is at § 28-01-18(3) of the North Dakota Century
Code, which provides that a legal malpractice suit is barred unless a party. commences the action
within two years after the cause of action accrues. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-18(3) (1981).
512. 340 N.W.2d at 449.
513. Id.
514. 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968).
515. 340 N.W.2d at 449.
516. 333 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1983).
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reasonably be discovered. The Phillips court saw no reason not to
extend this principle to legal malpractice and held that the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or with
reasonable diligence should know, (1) of the injury, (2) its cause,
and (3) defendant's possible negligence. 517 The Phillips court
concluded that Bailey did not meet the standard necessary for a
summary judgment because the fact issue of whether the statute of
limitations had run remained unanswered. 518
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc.
Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc. (BMA)
designed and built a sugar beet plant for Minn-Dak Farmers
Cooperative. 519 Layman injured himself when he backed into an
unguarded rotating shaft on a crystallizer in the plant. 520 Layman
received workmen's compensation in the amount of $18,779.74 for
the injury. 52 1 He then brought suit against BMA.5 22 The district
court found damages in the amount of $71,851.37, but reduced
BMA's liability to $17,962.88 because it found BMA twenty-five
percent negligent and Minn-Dak seventy-five percent negligent. 523
both Layman and BMA appealed raising three issues for the North
Dakota Supreme Court to decide. 524
The first issue was whether Layman must establish that he was
privy to the construction contract between BMA and Minn-Dak in
order to recover for the negligent performance of that contract. 525
The court, relying on the treatment of this issue in American
Jurisprudence (Second) held that an employee need not be privy to
the contract in order to sue a contractor for the negligent
construction of a workplace. 526 The court noted that the negligence
is not based on the contractual promise, but rather on the duty to
use ordinary care in performing the contractual promise. 527
517. 340 N.W.2d at 449.
518. Id.
519. Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 334, 336 (N.D.
1983).
520. Id. at 337.
521. Id. at 338.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 339.
525. Id. at 340.
526. Id. at 344. See 57 AM.JUR. 2DNegligence 5 48 (1971).
527. 343 N.W.2d at 341.
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The second issue was whether sufficient evidence existed to
support the trial court's findings that BMA had a duty to Layman,
that it negligently breached that duty, and that it proximately
caused Layman's injuries. 528 The court noted that these were
factual findings and thus could not be overturned unless they were
clearly erroneous.5 29 The court stated that "a finding is clearly
erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ' 530 The court
reviewed the findings of the district court in light of the evidence
and found that none of them were clearly erroneous. 53 1
The third issue was whether the trial court correctly reduced
Layman's recovery against BMA because of Minn-Dak's
negligence. 532 Layman could bring suit only against BMA because
his exclusive remedy against Minn-Dak was under the workmen's
compensation statutes. 533 BMA argued that this case was similar to
Bartels v. City of Williston,534 in which the court held that a plaintiff
who gave one tortfeasor a release from liability, thereby waived the
joint and several liability provision of the comparative negligence
statute. 535 The Layman court noted that Bartels involved a direct
conflict between section 32-38-04(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code, which provides for a reduction of claims against co-
tortfeasors when the plaintiff releases one of the tortfeasors and
section 9-10-07, which provides for joint and several liability. 536
The court found that no conflict existed in the present case and held
that the joint and several liability clause of the comparative
negligence statute controlled and, therefore, the apportionment of
damages by the trial court was incorrect. 537
528. Id. at 339.
529. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a).
530. 343 N.W.2d at 339.
531. Id. at 339-44.
532. Id. at 344.
533. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-05-06 (1960).
534. 343 N.W.2d at 349; See Bartels v. City ofWilliston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (1979).
535. Id. at 122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (when two or more tortfeasors are jointly
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to
each, provided that each shall remainjointly and severally liable for the whole award).
536. 343 N.W.2d at 349-50. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04(1) (1976) (discharge of one
tortfeasor from liability does not discharge other tortfeasors, but reduces the claim against the
others) with id. 5 9-10-07 (1975) (for contribution among tortfeasors, each shall remain jointly and
severally liable).
537. 343 N.W.2d at 350.
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